Coren on Isle of Man Civil Procedure

· whether the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention) applies in the Isle of Man: Jones & another v DEFA (2DS 2025/12) (08.07.25) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at §§ 1-15)

· absence of party

party / parties

· absence of witness

witness

foreign judgment

adjudication order / bankruptcy order;

· collateral attack to findings of another court: Kirk v Chief Constable & another (ORD 24/0015) (04.12.25) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 15-17)

defamation

· power to strike out a statement of case: Rule 7.3(2)(b) (“the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise liable to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings”)

o principles on abuse of process due to inordinate and inexcusable delay, causing inability to have a fair trial: A v DHSC (SUM 16/0062) (15.12.25) (Deemster Needham at § 7);

o commentary, Coren Law, Recent case-law on Isle of Man Limitation Issues (17.12.25)

· principles on res judicata, including issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel, abuse of process / the rule in Henderson v Henderson: Craine & Hommet v Cleator (2DS 2020/39) (07.07.21) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Arrowsmith at §§ 99-101); Alder & another v Lloyds Bank International plc (2DS 2015/6) (08.12.15) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Acting Deemster Christie QC at §§ 26-31); see now, on issue estoppel: Skatteforvaltningen v MCML Ltd [2026] UKSC 19 (01.07.26) (Lord Sales & Lord Doherty at §§ 38-53); commentary, Coren Law, Supreme Court guidance on issue estoppel: impact for the Isle of Man (01.07.26)

strike out

Article 6 ECHR; contingency fee agreements (CFA’s); inequality of arms; open justice; private, hearing in 

· right of access to court does not confer a right of appeal although, where such a right exists, Article 6(1) ECHR does apply to it: Hafner v HMAG & others (2DS 2007/17) (31.08.07) (§ 49) (citing (R (on the application of Aru) v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2004] EWCA Civ 199, [2004] 1 WLR 1697)

· right of access under Article 6(1) ECHR not absolute: Adenaike v DHA & another (2DS 2017/31) (13.04.18) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Deemster Corlett at §§ 97-98); Irving & another v FSA (11.10.18) (2DS 2018/7) (11.10.18) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Rosen QC at §§ 77-78)

sanctions, financial; strike out

· allocated to Chancery Procedure: Rule 13.84(1)

boundary / title / access dispute claims

· application for: para 18, Schedule 12.2

· jurisdiction: s 187 Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 (POCA)

· requirements for: s 188 POCA

· warning as to: Harper v VR Global Partners, LP & another (2DS 2025/03) (21.03.25) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 60: “whilst the court does not expect perfection in the documents that are submitted (recognising its own failings), advocates should at least try to achieve accuracy in the formalities that are required of them”)

· Acknowledgment of Service (Form HC2B)

· Chancery Procedure, requirement to file if allocated to: Rule 4.10(2)

· consequence of not filing: Rule 4.14(1)

default judgment

· defendant may file, if unable to file defence in time or if wishes to dispute jurisdiction: Rule 4.10(1)

· defendant, notes for: Form HC1B (Notes for Defendant)

· form and content: Rule 4.11

jurisdiction; particulars of claim

· statement of truth, requirement to be verified by: Rule 8.68(1)(d)

· time limit for filing: Rule 4.12

Additional Deemsters

· grounds: s 3 Action of Arrest Act 1953

o Raad v Sturgeon (SJ 2003/119) (30.10.03) (Deemster Doyle at § 59: claimant has to show: “(i) a debtor is about to leave… or has left the Isle of Man[;] (ii) he has a good cause of action against the debtor to the amount of £20 upwards[;] (iii) he has probable cause for believing that the debtor is removing, or intends to remove, from the Isle of Man the whole or a substantial part of his assets[;] and (iv) he has probable cause for believing that the debtor does not intend to settle the cause of action”)

· jurisdiction: s 4 Action of Arrest Act 1953 (Court may order coroner “to seize and appraise the assets of the debtor… up to the amount mentioned in the Order…”)

· procedure: s 3(b) Action of Arrest Act 1953 (“the creditor may make an ex parte application by petition to the Court praying for the seizure and appraisement of the assets of the debtor within this Isle, supported by an affidavit setting out the nature and particulars of the cause of the action against the debtor and the grounds of application and verifying that the cause of action is just and reasonable and that the absence of the defendant from the Isle of Man will materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action and the enforcement of any execution or Order of the Court consequent upon such proceedings”)

· Rule 7.16(1)(r)

· Paul Rodgers, George Johnson Prize essay, Three very Manx remedies (2009) (pp. 12-19)

alternative dispute resolution (ADR); court

· definition of: Rule 7.1(2)

· Howell v DHSS (ORD 09/24) (06.10.09) (§§ 3 & 8) (Deemster Doyle at § 8: “The ultimate aim of the court must, of course, be the attainment of justice. I accept that justice must not be sacrificed in favour of active case management simply for the sake of active case management. Courts however are concerned to do justice to all litigants…”)

· “key judicial warnings”: Deemster Corlett & Acting Deemster Gough, Managing Excessive Material in Commercial Litigation, Seminar Notes (Seminar, 04.11.25) (“Courts risk being “suffocated” by excessive written material to the detriment of justice. / Excessive paperwork = increased costs + delay, with no improvement in outcomes. / Opportunity exists to enforce existing Rules and prevent further decline”)

o commentary, Coren Law, Deemsters’ Warning on Excessive Written Material (12.25)

extension of time

parties

counterclaim

· description of parties: para 3, Schedule 3.2

· Form HC16 Claim Form (additional claim)

· non-party, procedural steps on service of additional claim against: Rule 6.55

· Rules 6.47-6.56

· service of additional claim form: Rule 6.52

· treated as a claim: Rule 6.47

· Governor may appoint one or more, on recommendation of First Deemster: 3B(1) High Court Act 1991

appeal

claim form

service

· Rule 11, Advocates’ Publicity Rules 2001 (“It is not proper for advocates to distribute to the press, radio or television, copies of a speech or address to any court, tribunal or inquiry, except at the time and place of the hearing to persons attending the hearing to report the proceedings”)

· all judges to be addressed in such manner as the First Deemster shall direct: s 3(6) High Court Act 1991

extension of time

· guidance (in particular dealing with medical evidence): Harding v ADT (CHP 2017/136) (11.04.18) (§ 64) (Acting Deemster Rosen QC, citing Solanki v Intercity & others [2018] EWCA Civ 101) (“20 … Although an adjournment is a discretionary matter, some adjournments must be granted if not to do so amounts to a denial of justice. Where the consequences of the refusal of an adjournment are severe, such as where it would lead to the dismissal of the proceedings, the tribunal or court must be particularly careful not to cause an injustice to the litigant seeking an adjournment. 21 A litigant whose presence is needed for the fair trial of a case, but who is unable to be present through no fault of his own, will usually have to be granted an adjournment, however inconvenient it may be to the tribunal or court and to the other parties. That litigant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 [ECHR] demands nothing less. But the tribunal or court is entitled to be satisfied that the inability of the litigant to be present is genuine, and the onus is on the applicant for an adjournment to prove the need for such an adjournment. 22 If there is some evidence that a litigant is unfit to attend, in particular if there is evidence that on medical grounds the litigant has been advised by a qualified person not to attend, but the tribunal or court has doubts as to whether the evidence is genuine or sufficient, the tribunal or court has a discretion whether or not to give a direction such as would enable the doubts to be resolved… All must depend on the particular circumstances of the case”)

party / parties

· jurisdiction: s 6 Bankruptcy Procedure Act 1892

o guidance on discretion: Lloyds Bank International Ltd v Alder (CHP 2014/51) (27.04.18) (§§ 10-22) (High Bailiff Needham at § 19 citing the 10-point list cited by Chief Registrar Baister in HMRC v Garwood [2012] BPIR 575)

o principles on dismissing a petition / claim when it is an abuse of process: Alder v Lloyds Bank International Ltd (2DS 2017/9) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Acting Deemster Christie QC at § 55), as read with the decision below: Lloyds Bank International Ltd v Alder (CHP 2014/51) (24.03.17) (High Bailiff Needham at §§ 4-11)

bankruptcy; universalism

advocate, duties of

arrest and sale of goods of execution debtor; arrest and sale of land of execution debtor; attachment of earnings order; attendance order (to attend before coroner); charging order; coroner; Enforcement Rules 1982; execution/execution order; execution debtor; garnishee order; interest; Judgments Register; right of audience

competence as a witness; hearsay evidence; statement in a document, proof of

trustees etc, representation of beneficiaries in claim

· Rules 13.36-13.48

appeal; conviction; evidence; hearsay evidence; mediation; privilege; similar fact evidence; statement in a document, proof of; without prejudice (WP)

· application for judgment on admission (made under Rule 6.19(2)): Rule 10.40

· defence, content of: Rule 6.31(1)(c) (“In his defence, the defendant must state … which allegations he admits”)

· defendant, notes for: Form HC1B (Notes for Defendant)

finality, principle of

· Form HC2C (Admission) (specified amount)

· Form HC2D (Admission) (other than for specified amount)

· judgment on admission: Rule 10.41(1) (“Where a defendant has admitted a claim under rule 6.21(1) or (3) (admission of whole or part of claim), the claimant may obtain judgment by filing a request”)

o R v DHSC (ORD 20/0008) (30.01.06) (§§ 26-34 & § 37) (application, in a ‘wrongful life’ clinical negligence claim, to vary consent order to clarify nature of an admission on liability and withdraw completely an admission on causation) (Deemster Needham at §§ 27-30 considering both: (a) Rule 7.2(7) and citing dicta of Acting Deemster Caine in Caddick, below; Hamblen LJ in Terry v BCS Corporate Acceptances Ltd & others [2018] EWCA Civ 2422 (“the circumstances in which CPR 3.1(7) can be relied upon to vary or revoke an interim order are limited. Normally, it will require a material change of circumstances since the order was made, or the facts on which the original decision was made being misstated”); and Lewison LJ in Vodafone Group Plc & Ors v IPCom GmbH & Co KG [2023] EWCA Civ 113 (10.02.23) (“(“The overwhelming thrust of the authorities is that the court’s power… to vary or revoke orders either cannot or should not be used to discharge a sealed final order. The only limited exception thus far even contemplated in civil proceedings is the case of a continuing order (such as a final injunction)”); and also (b) Rule 6.19(5), (below)

o commentary, Coren Law, Setting aside judgments on admission – Isle of Man High Court offers guidance in ‘wrongful life’ claim (07.02.26)

o see Old Mutual International Isle of Man Ltd v Caddick (ORD 2016/31) (30.10.17) (judgment at issue was a Rule 10.41 judgment on admission, not a default judgment) (see § 30)

o interest, circumstances where included, up to the date of judgment: Rule 10.42

· methods of: Rule 6.19(2)

particulars of claim

· period of time to file and serve an admission: Rule 6.20(1) (“(a) where the defendant is served with a claim form which states that particulars of claim will follow, 14 days after service of the particulars; and (b) in any other case, 14 days after service of the claim form“)

· permission of court required to amend or withdraw: Rule 6.19(5)

o see R v DHSC, above (§§ 35-36)

· request for time to pay: Rule 6.23

· rules: Rules 6.19-6.23

· Adoption Rules 2026

Article 8 ECHR

· conditions: s 30 Adoption Act 2021

· Form ADP1 Adoption Act 1984 [sic] (Application for an Order)

· guidance (note – cases below decided under the now-repealed Adoption Act 1984): Adoption Re: Child (ADP 2013/10) (15.07.14) (§§ 1-22) (Deemster Corlett citing at §§ 21-22 dicta in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146); re: Adoption of [a child] (ADP 2015/A273) (27.11.15) (§§ 1-16); In the Matter of an Application to adopt a child (dispensing with consent) (ADP 2013/9) (01.07.16) (§§ 1-25) (Deemster Corlett at § 3 citing his judgment in re: Adoption of [a child] (ADP 2015/A273) (27.11.15), above)

· jurisdiction: s 29 Adoption Act 2021

alternative dispute resolution (ADR)

disclosure; inferences; privilege against self-incrimination; security for costs; witness

accuracy; address to the Court, distribution to the press; advocate, duties of

· change of:

o advocate acting for a party: Rule 7.89 (“Where the address for service of a party is the business address of his advocate, the advocate shall be considered to be acting for that party until the provisions of this Chapter have been complied with”)

o notice of change of advocate: Form HC30 (Notice of Change of Advocate)

o order that advocate has ceased to act, jurisdiction: Rule 7.91(1)

o principles: Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd (in liquidation) (2DS 2015/15) (11.12.15) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC, Deemster Doyle & Acting Deemster Sir Michael Birt QC at §§ 12-32)

o procedure: Rule 7.91(2)

company; disclosure (see advocate or solicitor, duties of)

· integrity of, extent to which system of civil justice depends on: DHSC v Ranson (ORD 22/16) (11.10.22) (Deemster Corlett at § 27)

service; signature of documents; statement of truth

· unqualified person not to act as: s 9 Advocates Act 1976

co-operation between litigants and advocates; disclosure

· duty to act with other advocates in a manner consistent with persons having mutual trust and confidence in each other: Rule 3.12.1, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty to assist the administration of justice and never knowingly or recklessly to give false or misleading information to the court: Rule 3.11.2, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty to avoid taking unfair advantage of a litigant in person and, consistently with duty to client, to co-operate in assisting that person’s case to be fairly stated and justice to be done: Rule 3.11.15, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty (in tort / contract) to check correct time of hearing with court office and attend hearing on time: Irving & another v Carter t/a Carters & others (ORD 2013/19) (24.08.17) (Deemster Corlett at § 213)

· duty not to cease to act for clients without just cause and without giving reasonable notice or in a manner which would prejudice the course of justice: Rule 3.10.1, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty only to communicate with person known or believed to be the client of another advocate in certain specific circumstances: Rule 3.12.2. Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

·  duty not to make a submission which he/she does not consider to be properly arguable: see R v Crellin (CRIM 2012/32) (26.11.12) (Acting Deemster Montgomerie at § 15); see Manx Care v Elliott & another (CHP 25/141) (16.04.26) (Deemster Corlett at § 96)

· duty to decline to act further where a client admits that the client has committed perjury or materially misled the court, unless the client agrees to disclose their conduct to the court: Rule 3.11.8, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty at all times to do and be seen to do his best for his client and to be fearless in defending his client’s interests, regardless of the consequences to him: Rule 3.3.3, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty to endeavour to ensure that a client understands the duty of disclosure: para 14, PD 04/25

· duty to ensure that the relevant legal authorities are referred to the court: Willers v Gubay (2DS 2012/34) (06.03.13) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at § 60)

scrupulous fairness

· duty to honour an undertaking given to any court: Rule 3.11.10, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty to maintain due respect and courtesy to the court whilst honourably pursuing the interests of his clients: Rule 3.11.2, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty to say on behalf of client what the client would properly say for himself if he possessed the requisite skills and knowledge: Rule 3.11.14, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· duty to stand up to judges: Clucas v Clucas 1981-83 MLR 5 (§ 15); Clarkson & another v DoI (CHP 2011/43) (23.05.11) (Deemster Doyle at § 62)

· duty to treat witnesses with appropriate courtesy and respect when questioning them, as far as reasonably practical: Rule 3.11.4, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

full and frank disclosure

· lecture, David Doyle, Duties of Advocates to the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man (14.03.22)

officer of the court

· overriding duty to court: (“to ensure, in the public interest, that the proper and efficient administration of justice is achieved”): Rule 3,11.1, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

o Akhavan & another v Quinn Legal Advocates Ltd (ORD 2012/64) (19.11.13) (§§ (9 & 11) (High Bailiff Needham at § 9: “… counsel’s duty to the court ranks in priority to his duty to his client. It is counsel’s job to determine how best the client’s case is to be presented in light of counsel’s overriding duty to the court. The fact that the client may wish particular questions to be asked or points made does not mean that counsel will be in dereliction of his duty if he fails to follow such instructions bearing in mind his duty to the court. To quote Judge LJ.: “…the advocate is not a tinkling echo, or mouthpiece, spouting whatever his client “instructs” him to say”. Of course that does not mean that counsel can ignore instructions. Counsel must weigh them up in light of all the circumstances of a particular case and advise accordingly”) (applicable to civil proceedings: § 11)

· see Isle of Man Law Society website

costs (fixed costs for starting claim)

action of arrest

· cases where affidavit must be used: para 1(3), Schedule 8.1

· courts.im, Swearing of Affidavits

· form of: Rule 8.15; Schedule 8.1

· when required: Rule 8.14(1) (“… if this is required by the court, a provision contained in any other rule or another statutory provision”)

witness statement; worldwide freezing order (WFO) / freezing injunction 

disclosure; service out of the jurisdiction

· if seeking, particulars of claim must include statement to that effect, and grounds: Rule 6.12(1)(c)

· guidance: Creechurch Capital Ltd v Sutton (ORD 2018/41) (21.01.19) (Acting Deemster Rosen QC at §§ 49-64); Ranson v DHSC (21/20) (02.05.23) (EET Chairman Stewart at §§ 137-145) (£20,000 awarded)

exemplary damages

particulars of claim

· existence of agricultural holding a mixed question of fact and law: Alder & others v Kelly & another (2DS 2020/2) (28.09.20) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Christie QC at § 78)

o applicable test: per Lord Templeman in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, applied at §§ 7-9 by Deemster Needham in Kelly & another v Alder & others (ORD 2019/2) (20.12.19), in turn approved on appeal in Alder & others v Kelly & another, above)

· notice to quit: s 9, Agricultural Holdings Act 1969; Alder & another v Corkish & another (LC151) (18.02.26) (Land Court Chairman Brooks at §§ 6-8)

o commentary, Cains’ Judgment Journal (25.05.26)

· parallel jurisdiction of High Court with Land Court: Alder & others v Kelly & another, above (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Christie QC at §§ 53-60)

o ss 19(1), 19(3) & 37, Agricultural Holdings Act 1969

· commentary (general): AIIOM, Setting Precedents: Why the Isle of Man Needs to Pick an Approach to AI in Court (22.03.26); Coren Law, Use of smart glasses in Court – updates from jurisdictions facing novel threat (29.03.25); Coren Law, UK Courts issue Position Statement on Judicial use of AI (09.10.26); M&P Legal, The Cost Implications of Using Fake AI-Generated Hallucinated Legal Authorities (23.02.26)

· guidance (English cases): R (on the application of Frederick Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) (§ 87: “The critical safeguard is to check any output by reference to an authoritative source”);  UK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKUT 81 (17.11.25) (§ 37: “… the qualified legal professional with conduct of the matter is expected to ensure that such documents are checked, that errors are identified, and that only accurate documents are sent to the tribunal. To fail to conduct such checks is wasteful of the tribunal’s time”)

· guidance (English professional bodies): General Council of the Bar, Considerations when using ChatGPT or any other generative AI software based on large language models (LLMs) (updated 25.11.25); Law Society of England & Wales, Generative AI: the essentials (01.10.25)

· liability issues: see The UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (UKJT), Legal Statement on Liability for AI Harms (09.07.26)

· privilege, impact of AI upon: see UK v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above (§ 21) (“… to put client letters and decision letters from the Home Office into an open source AI tool, such as ChatGPT, is to place this information on the internet in the public domain, and thus to  breach client confidentiality and waive legal privilege, and thus any regulated legal professional or firm that does so would, in addition to needing to bring this to the attention of their regulator, be advised to consult with the Information Commissioner’s Office. Closed source AI tools which do not place information in the public domain, such as Microsoft Copilot, are available for tasks such as summarising without these risks”)

o AIIOM, Confidentiality, Privilege, and the Prompt Box (25.08.26)

smart technology, use of in Court

particulars of claim

Chancery Procedure

· factors to which court has regard when allocating: Rule 5.5(4)

· general rules for: Rule 5.5

Ordinary Procedure; Small Claims Procedure; Summary Procedure

· case management power to order parties to engage in: Rule 7.2(2)(ma) (note – added by the Rules of the High Court of Justice (Amendment) 2025)

contractual determination; costs; expert determination; mediation; ombudsmen; petition for redress

· reminder on court orders (“The parties are reminded of their obligations under the overriding objective, in particular, to consider settling this matter by means of alternative dispute resolution (including mediation). The Court may impose costs sanctions if parties to not comply with these obligations”)

service; service out of the jurisdiction

· amendment of statement of case: Rule 6.37

· directions for consequential amendments to other statements of case and service: Rule 6.39

· factors for court to consider in respect of Rule 6.37: Excalibur Almaz Ltd & others v Horie (ORD 2015/61) (24.01.20) (§§ 20 & 48-55) (Deemster Corlett at § 20: “The court in exercising its discretion under Rule 6.37 must consider the lateness of the application to amend; the prospects of success of the proposed amendment; and whether the limitation period in relation to the proposed amendments has expired”); Holmes v Carters (2DS 2018/4) (26.07.18) (§§ 47-57) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Deemster Doyle at § 48: “… once the necessity to amend has become apparent, a party should immediately tell his opponents about the amendments he intends to seek, so as to enable them to consider whether to oppose or consent to them. A full explanation must be provided if the application is being made late…”)

limitation

injunction; interim injunction

consent order; Family proceedings; matrimonial proceedings

open justice

· commentary, Coren Law, Anti-suit injunctions – new guidance from Isle of Man High Court (19.08.26)

· principles: Excalibur Almaz Ltd & others v Horie (2DS 2017/19) (24.11.17) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC, Deemster Doyle & Acting Deemster Birt QC at §§ 60-63); Velayudhan & another v Chalmers Holdings Ltd (CHP 2020/21) (10.06.20) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 13-19); Hansard International Ltd v Ripamonti & others (CHP 25/0105) (18.08.26) (Acting Deemster Gough at §§ 23-36)

· DEFA v Richardson (CHP 2019/122) (28.10.20) (Deemster Needham at § 90 citing Lord Carnwath in Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20; [2015] AC 455 at § 245)

· additional evidence on appeal

o test for admitting: Excalibur Almaz Ltd & others v Horie (2DS 2018/16) (25.03.19) (§§ 23-24); Bellamy v Forster (2DS 2017/28) (06.04.18) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Deemster Doyle at § 67: “… These questions are appropriate for a first instance court which can hear evidence on such issues… If we admitted this evidence the reviewing court would no longer be ‘error-correcting’ but a primary court of record. As we stated in A v B an appeal court is not well placed to consider and rule on the accuracy of further evidence”)

o note Wallis v Soberano Ltd (2DS 2014/21) (16.01.15) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at § 7: “As to the application to adduce fresh evidence, the materiality of such evidence… was not readily apparent… and recognising that this court should… have regard to the possible merits of an appeal in deciding whether to allow fresh evidence to be adduced, the court suggested… that it might be preferable to allow the evidence to be adduced on the appeal de bene esse with an opportunity given to Soberano, if so advised, to file fresh evidence in response to that filed by the Appellant. Although it may prove necessary for the court to ultimately determine whether the Appellant should be permitted to rely on such fresh evidence, the court concluded… that it would be preferable that any such determination should take place in the context of the determination of the appeal itself…”)

evidence on appeal, general rule, below

Appeal Division

· appeal notice, time for filing

o if not prescribed by a relevant statutory provision or directed by the lower court: “21 days after the date of the decision of the lower court”: Rule 14.2A

· bundle

o guidance on: Vermeulen & another v Harbour House Ltd & others (2DS 2022/28) (23.12.22) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Rosen KC at § 54) (“in future this court would be better assisted in preparation by, and will require, a single joint: (1) list and bundle of authorities; and (2) list and core document bundle for pre-reading, with the written submissions, of the essential law and first-instance documents referred to therein”)

electronic bundle, guidance on contents of, below; record of proceedings, below

· case stated, appeals by way of

o Rule 14.16

· commentary

o BridsonHalsall, Significant Changes in Appeal Time Limits Now in Force (06.12.24);  Cains, Appeals and Permission to Appeal in the Isle of Man (23.10.25)

· consent orders / costs-only orders

o leave to appeal required: s 19(1) High Court Act 1991

o test: “whether the appeal has a real prospect of success, or whether there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard”: McNally & others v Sodzawiczny (2DS 2022/39-41, 43) (04.04.23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Morris at § 9 applying LCL International Life Assurance Co Ltd v Henderson & others (2DS 2015/19) (12.01.16))

o guidance on appellate costs jurisdiction: Willers v Gubay (2DS 2012/34) (06.03.13) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at § 12: “… in appeals in respect of the assessment of costs the appellate jurisdiction is one of review (see Ross v Stonewood Securities Ltd [2004] EWHC 2235 (Ch) Lewison J at paragraph 22) and an appellate court can only interfere with the decision of a court below if it is persuaded that the court below had “exceeded the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible””); Summerhill Trust Co. (Isle of Man) Ltd v Mazzoleni & others (2DS 2019/6) (22.07.19) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Deemster Corlett at § 31: “This court will very rarely disturb a lower court‘s decision on costs where the Deemster has exercised his or her discretion“)

· courts.im

o A guide to the civil appeals court

discontinuance

· directions

o Rule 14.8(1) (“Promptly upon the later of the filing of a notice of appeal or, if required, permission to appeal being granted, the appeal court shall give directions for the hearing of the appeal”)

· discretion

o grounds to interfere with exercise of by the lower court

standard of review, below

· electronic bundle

o guidance on contents of: Hermitage One Ltd v Heda Airlines Ltd (2DS 2021/009) (06.09.21) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Rosen QC at § 87) (see also Appellate Advocacy in the Staff of Government Division, below p. 3)

· evidence on appeal

o general rule: Rule 14.14(3) (not to receive oral evidence or evidence not before the lower court)

additional evidence on appeal, test for admitting, above

extraneous material leading to adverse determination, reliance on

· Forms

o Form HC11 Appeal Notice (appellant)

o Form HC11A Guidance Notes – Appeal Notice (appellant)

o Form HC12 Appeal Notice (respondent)

o Form HC12A Guidance Notes – Appeal Notice (respondent)

forum non conveniens

· fresh point on appeal

o whether a party may raise: Petrodel Resources Ltd v Le Breton (2DS 2012/26) (20.07.12) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at § 18)

· grounds on which appeal from decision of lower court must be allowed

o Rule 14.14(4) (ie. where the decision was: “(a) wrong; or (b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity”)

standard of review, below

immigration appeals

· insolvency proceedings, finality of first instance judgment, pending appeal

o  Nectrus Ltd v Joint Liquidators of UCP PLC (in liquidation) (CHP 26/0001) (11.09.26) (Acting Deemster Hodge KC at § 81); commentary, Coren Law, Very mixed news for Cyprus company in Isle of Man proof of debt appeal (24.09.26)

· interim order

o single judge of High Court may at any time make, “to prevent prejudice to the claims of any parties pending an appeal”: s 22(6) High Court Act 1991

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC)

· lecture

o Jeremy Storey KC, Appellate Advocacy in the Staff of Government Division (24.11.22) (Caroline Weatherill Memorial Lecture)

· leave to appeal / permission to appeal (PTA) (to Appeal Division)

o application totally without merit (TWM): Rule 14.3B(4)

o case management decision, application for leave to appeal in relation to: Rule 14.4D(1) (“the court may take into account whether — (a) the issue is of sufficient significance to justify the costs of an appeal; (b) the procedural consequences of an appeal (e.g. loss of trial date) outweigh the significance of the case management decision; (c) it would be more convenient to determine the issue at or after trial”)

o compliance with Article 6(1) ECHR: Oakley & another v Callin (2DS 2024/02) (20.05.24) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 21 cross-referring Rule 14.3A to CPR 52.3)

o costs: Moorgate Industries UK Ltd v Global Steel Holdings Ltd (in liquidation) (2DS 2024.24) (10.02.26) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 36: “… the permission to appeal scheme is designed so as to ensure that costs are not wasted by lengthy documents and protracted submissions. If I am required to assess costs, I will have the scheme very much in mind…”)

o generally: Rule 14.3A

o no appeal against decision to give or refuse permission: s 19A(3) High Court Act 1991; Bell v HMSG (2DS 2025/07) (08.07.25) (§§ 6-11) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 7: “There is no provision for an appeal to the JCPC from this decision of the Appeal Division… [s] 19A(3) is designed to achieve finality. The Appeal Division simply has no jurisdiction to grant permission to appeal from its decision refusing permission to appeal”) (NB: application for permission to appeal to the JCPC issued 04.02.26)

commentary, Cains’ Judgment Journal (07.25); Maher Law, No PTA Refusal Appeal to Privy Council (05.08.25)

o order: appeal lies against order, rather than judgment: LCL Life Assurance Company Ltd v Henderson & another (2DS 2015/7) (12.08.15) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at § 16: “… an appeal lies against an order made by a Deemster as opposed to his judgment so that it necessarily follows that even if his judgment deals with matters which are not relevant or determinative of the application before him, his decision can only be successfully appealed if an appellant can demonstrate that the order made by the Deemster can be validly impugned”)

o request for reconsideration at an oral hearing after refusal of permission to appeal: Rule 14.3(B)(3); Al-Zubaidi v Alzubeydi & others (2DS 2024/23) (02.12.24) (§ 2) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC: “The fact of refusal on paper does not necessarily always indicate that an oral application may not succeed. Good advocacy, quite obviously, can sometimes bring to life what would otherwise appear to be dead or dying points, so this court will never discourage the exercise of the right to an oral hearing, if permitted by the Rules“)

o statistics on permission to appeal applications in respect of civil matters: see Table 1 below

o test (first appeals): Rule 14.3C (“… permission… may be given only where — (a) the court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard”)

o guidance on first limb of test: Bell v HM Solicitor General (2DS 2025/07) (15.05.25) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 9) (“The test I apply here is that “there must be a realistic, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success”. There is no requirement that success should be probable, or more likely than not”)

o time-limit: see “appeal notice, time for filing”, above

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC)

o Table 1: Number of reported civil applications for permission to appeal (PTA’s) since 01.01.24 (data source: Isle of Man Courts & Tribunals Service, Annual Reports 2024 & 2025)

planning appeal

· record of proceedings

o see lecture, Appellate Advocacy, above (p. 2)

· re-opening of final appeal

o Rule 14.20

o Willers v Gubay (2DS 2014/14) (30.04.15) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at §§ 19-20)

· respondent’s notice

o Rule 14.7(2) (respondent who seeks permission to appeal or to ask the appeal court to uphold the lower court order “for reasons different from or additional to” the lower court, must file)

Appeal Notice (respondent) (Form HC12), above

retrial

· second appeals

o Rule 14.4 (“(1) Permission is required from the Appeal Division for any appeal to that Division from a decision of the Civil Division which was itself made on appeal. (2) The Appeal Division shall not give permission unless it considers that — (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice; or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the Appeal Division to hear it”)

o guidance Jones v Office of the Clerk of Tynwald (2DS 2024/14) (02.09.24) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 25)

· security for costs on appeal: Rule 7.30 as read with Rule 14.5

o burden of proving stifling: on appellant: Treehouse Properties SL & others v Sodzawiczny (2DS 2022/14) (16.08.22) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Corbett QC at § 37, citing Lord Wilson (with whom Lords Neuberger and Hodge agreed) in Goldtrail Travel Limited (in liquidation) v Onur Air Taşimacilik AŞ, SC, [2017] 1 WLR 3014 at § 15) (“if the proposed condition is otherwise appropriate, the objection that it would stifle the continuation of the appeal represents a contention which needs to be established by the appellant and indeed, although it is hypothetical, to be established on the balance of probabilities”)

o quantum: Sabadash & others v VTB Bank PJSC (2DS 2018/11) (05.11.18) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Christie QC at §§ 12-17)

o reason to believe that appellant / respondent who appeals, a limited company or limited liability company, “will be unable to pay the costs of the other parties to the appeal should its appeal be unsuccessful”: Rule 14.5(2)

· standard of review

o generally: Ballacorey Wheat Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc (2DS 2020/23) (04.12.20) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Le Cocq at §§ 27-29)

o interference with exercise of discretion based on findings of fact by trial judge: Parc Aviation Services Ltd t/a CAE Parc Aviation Services v Mueller (2DS 2023/01) (12.07.23) (§§ 29-33) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Caine at § 29: appeal court should not interfere with exercise of discretion of lower court unless satisfied the decision was “plainly wrong” (Eurotrust test, ie. where the discretion was exercised: “(1) under a mistake of law; (2) under a misapprehension of facts; (3) in disregard of principle; (4) by taking into account irrelevant matters; (5) in a manner that failed to exercise his discretion at all; or (6) by reaching a conclusion which exceeded the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible and was thereby plainly wrong to that the only legitimate conclusion was that he erred in the exercise of his discretion”)); (at § 30) (“… It does not matter… that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached”);

o appeal court “will not interfere with the primary facts found by a lower court unless there is “incontrovertible factual material showing that the findings were unjustified or could not have been reached by a tribunal acting reasonably on the basis of the primary facts found”” (McNally & others v Sodzawiczny (2DS 2022/39-41, 43) (04.04.23), below (§ 21)); X v Y (2DS 2025/24) (23.12.25) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 27: “This court is simply not entitled to disagree with findings of fact made by trial judges unless there is incontrovertible material which shows that the findings of fact are unjustified. It is for the judge who hears the evidence who is best placed to weigh that evidence. Where judges in the lower court draw inferences of fact from primary facts, then this court cannot interfere and substitute its own preferred inference for that judge’s justifiable alternative inference”)

o criteria to challenge a finding of fact, as summarised by Lewison LJ in Volpi v Volpi [2022] 4 WLR 48, as approved in Humbles & others v Wickers & others (2DS 2025/17) (01.06.26) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC, Acting Deemster Sir Nigel Teare KC & Acting Deemster Rosen KC at § 164) (“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong. ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him. v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge’s conclusion was rationally insupportable. vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract”)

o reasons underpinning current state of learning: McNally & others v Sodzawiczny (2DS 2022/39-41, 43) (04.04.23) (§§ 22-23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Morris at § 23: “Appellate interference must be kept to the bare minimum compatible with the need to avoid injustice”)

o failure to take into account relevant factor, questionable to criticise judge if not invited to consider: Hiranandani v Hirco plc (2DS 2014/2) (26.09.14) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Acting Deemster Storey QC at § 156)

· statistics on

o 2021-2025:

Isle of Man Courts & Tribunals Service, Annual Report 2025 (p. 19)

· statutory appeal

o right of “any person” to apply to file evidence or make representations: Rule 14(17)

o Manx Care v Elliott & another (CHP 25/141) (16.04.26) (Deemster Corlett at § 3)

· stay pending appeal

o not automatic: Rule 14.10; requirement for “solid grounds” and test (“some form of irremediable harm”): Irving v Harding et al (2DS 2011/18) (15.06.12) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Acting Deemster Storey QC at §§ 10-12); affirmed, Hillberry Trust Co. Ltd & another v Montpelier (Trust & Corporate) Services Ltd (in liquidation) (2DS 2023/21) (11.07.23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 7); see McNally & another v Glen Moar Properties Ltd (in liquidation in the BVI) (2DS 2023/04) (16.01.24) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC, Acting Deemster Sir Nigel Teare & Acting Deemster Moran KC at Appendix, § 8: “This court was not satisfied that there was or might be irremediable prejudice to the Appellants”); Humbles & others v Wickers & others (2DS 2025/17) (14.08.26) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC, Sir Nigel Teare & Acting Deemster Rosen KC at § 23) (“Where permission to appeal has been granted, a stay of a judgment is not granted simply because permission to appeal has been granted. It must be shown that there are “good reasons”, “special circumstances” or “solid grounds” for doing so. If there are, then the court must consider a balancing exercise weighing the risks of injustice to each side if a stay were or were not granted”) (& § 30) (“…we are not satisfied that there are the required “solid grounds” showing “irremediable harm or prejudice” of the type commonly required to justify a stay”)

· time-limit: see “appeal notice, time for filing”, above

· time limit for appeals, variation of

o application to vary time limit for appeal: Rule 14.9(1)

o commencement of: FSA v Montpelier (Trust and Corporate) Services Ltd (CHP 2019/66) (04.11.19) (§ 10)

o extension of time, relevant factors on: Vermeulen v Harbour House Ltd & others (2DS 2022/26) (03.11.22) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Rosen KC at §§ 13-15: “the length and reasons for the delay, the degree of prejudice to the potential respondents if the application is granted and the chances of the appeal succeeding if the application is granted, if the court assesses that as very weak or very strong without much investigation”); Megson v Preynor Foundation (2DS 21/05) (12.03.21) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Wild at § 9)

o discretion to extend time, if Article 6(1) ECHR engaged: Morris & another v Assessor of Income Tax (2DS 2017/17) (16.11.17) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC, Deemster Doyle & Acting Deemster Sir Michael Birt QC at § 42: “(i) Subject to (ii), where a statute provides a fixed time limit for an appeal, the court has no discretion under the Rules of the High Court or under its inherent jurisdiction to extend that period. It has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal brought out of time. If the legislature wishes to confer a discretion on the court to extend the time limit it may of course do so by specifically conferring such a power in the relevant statute; but if it does not do so, that is the end of the matter. (ii) However, where an appeal involves the determination of a ‘civil right’ for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR (but not otherwise), the court may read down the provisions of the statute in accordance with section 3 of the Human Rights Act 2001 so as to give effect to the statute in a way which is compatible with Convention rights. This involves asserting a discretion to extend the time limit in the case before it if it concludes that application of the time limit to the particular facts would “impair the very essence” of the right of access to the court for the appeal”)

o Table 2: Extending time to appeal, comparison of case-law examples (note – the period of time to appeal changed on 1^st December 2024: see Rule 14.2A, above)

· transcript

o see lecture, Jeremy Storey KC, Appellate Advocacy in the Staff of Government Division (24.11.22) (Caroline Weatherill Memorial Lecture) (“Only include [in the hard copy bundles] transcripts of evidence or submissions where this is essential. Even if a transcript of the entire hearing has been obtained it does not mean that it all has to be included in the appeal bundle. The costs may not be recoverable if unnecessary transcripts are included… they are often routinely included for most civil appeals and rarely of assistance”)

tribunals

· circumstances where Appeal Division may overrule an earlier Appeal Division decision: HMAG v Neeson (2DS 2023/14) (07.12.23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC, Deemster Corlett & Acting Deemster Sir Nigel Teare at § 51 citing Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718)

· composition of: s 22 High Court Act 1991

o duly constituted if it consists of at least 2 Deemsters: s 22(1) High Court Act 1991

o Oakley & another v Callin (2DS 2024/02) (20.05.24) (§§ 42-51) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC citing at §§ 43-45 dicta in Oakley v Osiris (2DS 2013/20) (31.03.14))

o powers may be exercised, with parties’ consent, by single judge: s 22(2) High Court Act 1991

o powers exercisable by single judge: s 22(3) High Court Act 1991 (including: “(a) to give leave to appeal; (b) to extend the time within which notice of appeal, or of an application for leave to appeal, may be given … “)

· judge may not sit in, on hearing an appeal against the judgment or order made by himself: s 2(4)(a) High Court Act 1991

o does not apply to permission to appeal application: Moussavi v VR Global Partners, LP & others (2DS 2024/17 and 2DS 2025/05) (04.06.25) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC, Sir Nigel Teare & Acting Deemster Moran KC at § 83)

o commentary, Coren Law, “[A]s indifferently as the herring’s backbone doth lie in the midst of the fish”: Appeal Division updates recusal test

· jurisdiction: s 11 High Court Act 1991

Staff of Government Division (SOGD)

appeal

· Application Notice (general) (Form HC8A)

       o court can dispense with the need to file: Rule 7.5(2)(b)

case summary

· contents of, required: Rule 7.8

o draft order must be attached: Rule 7.8(3)

· draft order, applicant must bring to hearing (except in the case of the most simple applications): para 8, Schedule 7.1

o see Coren Law, Deemsters’ Warning on Excessive Written Material (12.25) (section on “Inter-party relations”)

enforcement

· evidence

o court can give directions on filing of: para 5(1), Schedule 7.1

o if intended to rely on evidence not contained in the application, evidence must be served with application: para 5(2), Schedule 7.1

· rules relating to: Schedule 7.1

· service of: Rule 7.6(1) (requirement to serve copy of application notice on each respondent)

o exceptions: Rule 7.6(2)

o see Rule 2.40 (where no claim has been started)

· service of out of the jurisdiction: Rule 2.49(1) (“Rules 2.41 to 2.48 apply with any necessary modifications to service out of the jurisdiction of an application notice or order”)

time limit for service of, general rule, below

· statistics on, 2021-2025, Isle of Man Courts & Tribunals Service, Annual Report 2025 (Ordinary & Chancery Procedure) (p. 19)

· time limit for making (“as soon as it becomes apparent that it is necessary or desirable to make it”): para 1(5), Schedule 7.1

· time limit for service of, general rule (as soon as practicable after filing, and in any event at least 3 days before the court dealing with): Rule 7.9(1)

· withdrawal of: see Bellamy v Land Registry & another (LAND 2017/584) (06.02.24) (“Flawed and unmeritorious applications should be withdrawn at the earliest stage”) (Land Commissioner Gough at § 23) (NB: case decided under Land Registry Rules 2000, not the RHCJ)

· without notice: application for a direction not to serve an application notice on a respondent may be made by letter without notice to respondent: Rule 7.6(4)

o copy of order made requires to be served on party against whom order was sought or made, together with application notice and evidence in support: Rule 7.11

o  guidance on time period to serve: Principal Contracts Ltd (in voluntary liquidation) acting by its liquidator Craig Mitchell v Rowe & others (ORD 23/0024) (14.01.25) (§§ 52-56) (Deemster Corlett at § 53 referring to s 50 Interpretation Act 2015)

· application to enforce under s 27 Arbitration Act 1976

o evidence, requirements for: Rule 13.53(5)

o guidance: Golar LNG NB13 Corporation v Sahara Energy Resource Ltd (CHP 2017/117) (27.10.17) (§§ 9-22) (Deemster Doyle at § 13: “…The presumption must be in favour of expeditious enforcement”) (policy reasons: §§ 14-21)

o jurisdiction: s 27 Arbitration Act 1976 (“An award on an arbitration agreement may, by leave of the Court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect; and, where leave is so given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award”); example: Treehouse Properties SL & others v Sodzawiczny (2DS 2022/14) (20.01.23) (§ 7)

o order must meet requirements in Rule 13.53(9)

o procedure (application is without notice in a claim form): Rule 13.53: see Golar, above (§ 12) (“it is the practice of this court to consider applications for the enforcement of arbitration awards, in appropriate cases, initially on a without notice basis with liberty to the defendant to apply to set aside the order“)

arbitration claims

· reference back to arbitrator for re-consideration

o s 23 Arbitration Act 1976 (“… the Court may from time to time remit the matters referred, or any of them, to the reconsideration of the arbitrator…”)

o In the Matter of Skerryvore Ltd 1981-83 MLR 232(Deemster Luft at § 235: “Mr Gough referred to [s 23] Arbitration Act 1976 … These grounds [for re-consideration] were set forth in… Re Montgomery, Jones & Co. and Liebenthal & Co [(1898), 78 L.T. 406]… by Chitty [LJ]…: (1) [W]here the award is bad on the face of it; (2) where there has been misconduct on the part of the arbitrator; (3) where there has been an admitted mistake, and the arbitrator himself asks that the matter may be remitted; and (4) where additional evidence has been discovered after the making of the award”… The court’s discretion is not, however, limited to these specific grounds”)

· set aside enforcement order, application to

o grounds to set aside: see Golar, above (Deemster Doyle at § 14, citing Deemster Cain in Gispen 1999-01 MLR 91: “it was rare for an arbitration award which was final and conclusive to be denied enforcement or recognition for reasons of public policy in the absence of fraud or breach of natural or substantial justice apparent on the face of the award” (see also § 24: “public policy grounds such as fraud, lack of natural justice…”)

o jurisdiction: s 24(2) Arbitration Act 1976 (“Where an arbitrator… has misconducted himself or the proceedings, or an arbitration or award has been improperly procured, the Court may set the award aside”)

o time limit: Rule 13.53(8) (“Within 14 days after service of the order or, if the order is to be served out of the jurisdiction, within such other period as the court may set”)

service out of the jurisdiction

arbitral award, enforcement of; arbitration claims

arbitral award, enforcement of; arbitration claims; arbitration stay; interim relief / remedy

· Appeal Division lacked jurisdiction to hear purported appeal from decision of arbitrator: A v B & others (2DS 0000/00) (19.04.17) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Acting Deemster Rosen QC at § 20: “Arbitration Claims under the Arbitration Act 1976 are not appeals against the decisions of courts but arise from proceedings before and awards made by arbitrators”)

arbitral award, enforcement of

· definition of: Rule 13.49(1) (“an application to the court under the 1976 Act“)

· Form HC4D Acknowledgment of Service (arbitration claim)

· Form HC80 Claim Form (Arbitration)

· how to start: Rule 13.50

· rules on: Rules 13.49-13.55

· service out: Rule 13.52

· time limit: Rule 13.51

· mandatory stay of legal proceedings in favour of arbitration, proper legal approach to determination of applications under s 5 Arbitration Act 1976: McNally & another v Glen Moar Properties Ltd (in liquidation in the BVI) (2DS 2023/04) (16.01.24) (§§ 30-43) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC, Acting Deemster Sir Nigel Teare & Acting Deemster Moran KC citing decisions of the Supreme Court in Republic of Mozambique (acting through its Attorney General) v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) & others [2023] UKSC 32 and the JCPC in FamilyMart China Holding Co Ltd v Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corporation [2023] UKPC 33) (at § 30: “… the legal approach this court must follow in determining this appeal, especially relating as it does to an international arbitration and which is to be followed henceforth in the Isle of Man on applications for a stay of legal proceedings under [s] 5 of the 1976 Act, is that now comprehensively set out in the FamilyMart decision”); Garrod v Manx Utilities Authority (SCP 2026/0040) (14.07.26)

o commentary, Coren Law, Arbitration stays in the Isle of Man (12.25)

· exercisable by High Court, if all parties agree: s 12A Arbitration Act 1976

arbitral award, enforcement of

coroner

· exceptions: para 2, Schedule 1, Administration of Justice Act 1981

execution / execution debtor

jurisdiction: para 1, Schedule 1, Administration of Justice Act 1981 (Coroner may “subject to the provisions of Part II, and of this Schedule and to any order… arrest, in the enforcement of an execution order, any of the following property… (a) money, bills of exchange, bonds and promissory notes and any other securities for money belonging to the execution debtor… (c) goods in which the execution debtor has a saleable interest in his own right… (f) any other property of the execution debtor other than land”)

coroner

effect of arrest is to charge execution debtor’s estate and interest in the land: para 3, Schedule 2, Administration of Justice Act 1981

execution / execution order

· forcible entry of premises closed against the coroner, leave of Deemster required: para 2, Schedule 2, Administration of Justice Act 1981

o Future Loans Ltd v Wright (SUM 2010/134) (17.12.15) (Deemster Corlett at § 6: “The legislation does not permit a forced entry without permission of a Deemster, and if an occupant does say ‘no’… and closes the door in the Coroner’s face, then the Coroner has absolutely no reason not to apply to the court, and has every reason to do so under Schedule 2, paragraph 2…”)

o Foxdale Properties v Booth (DEF 2003/2016) (17.06.10) (High Bailiff Needham at § 6: “It appeared to be agreed that by custom, where the coroner sought to sell land which is used as a residence leave of the court is sought for such sale… if the application had not been made on behalf of the judgment creditor as a result of reliance upon paragraph 5, the debtor would have applied to the court for an order against sale. I note the customary method of dealing with such applications and I am satisfied that the Court’s discretion under Schedule 2 of the 1981 Act is sufficiently wide to encompass an application from either creditor or debtor as to whether the property should be sold”) (§ 13) (“I will need to consider all relevant circumstances including: the amount of money owed, the length of time such money has been outstanding, the efforts made by the debtor to pay the amount owed, the likely equity in the property available to satisfy the debt if a sale was ordered, the interests of other residential occupiers in particular any minors and the right of the creditor not to have to wait indefinitely for payment”); applied in Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets PLC v Wilmot & another (ORD 24/0042) (12.12.25) (§§ 32-33); commentary: Cains’ Judgment Journal (12.25)

· land arrested must be sold by public auction, unless otherwise ordered by the court: para 5, Schedule 2, Administration of Justice Act 1981 See Barclays Bank PLC v Failte Property Ltd (ORD 22/0020) (21.12.23) (Deemster Corlett at § 18: “Paragraph 5 of Schedule 2 to the Administration of Justice Act 1981 provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, land arrested by the Coroner must be sold by public auction. Thus the court’s approval must be sought for a sale by private treaty. Sales by Coroner’s auction do not require any application to the court, save in so far as there may be a need for a Coroner to enter a property by force under paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Administration of Justice Act 1981“)

· jurisdiction: para 1, Schedule 2, Administration of Justice Act 1981 (Coroner may: “subject to the provisions of Part II and of this Schedule and to any order… arrest, in the enforcement of an execution order, any land in which the execution debtor has a saleable interest”)

· public auction, land arrested to be advertised for sale and sold at, by or under the direction of a coroner: para 5, Schedule 2 Administration of Justice Act 1981

· final arrestment order, jurisdiction: Rule 12.27(1) (“requiring a third party to pay to the judgment creditor – (a) the amount of any debt due or accruing due to the judgment debtor from the third party; or (b) so much of that debt as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt and the judgment creditor’s costs…”)

· Form HC20 (Application for Arrestment Order)

· interim arrestment order, jurisdiction: Rule 12.29

· jurisdiction to enforce judgment or order for the payment of money via: Rule 12.2(1)(c)

· rules on: Rules 12.26-12.36

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); winding-up order

Coroner of Inquests; European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

detention, review of; European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

access to court/justice; appeal; arrest and sale of land of execution debtor; contingency fee agreements (CFA’s); debarring / debarment order; European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); foreign judgment; human rights; Human Rights Act 2001; imprisonment for debt; inequality of arms; open justice; recusal; security for costs; service

care order; child / children; European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); immigration appeals; Partition Act 1931 (applications under for division / sale of land); possession order

· Origo Partners PLC v Brooks Macdonald Asset Management & another (CHP 2014/49) (09.07.15) (Deemster Doyle at § 94); applied, Evans v Wilsons Trust Corporation Ltd & others (CHP 25/0059) (10.11.25) (Deemster Needham at § 35)

costs

· jurisdiction (note – court of summary jurisdiction): s 41(1) Children and Young Persons Act 2001 (CYPA) (“… if (and only if) it is satisfied that – (a) the Department has reasonable cause to suspect that the child is suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm; (b) an assessment of the state of the child’s health or development, or of the way in which he has been treated, is required to enable the Department to determine whether or not the child is suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm; and (c) it is unlikely that such an assessment will be made, or be satisfactory, in the absence of an assessment order”)

expert evidence

· s 17 High Court Act 1991; Rule 8.67

worldwide freezing order (WFO) / freezing injunction

action of arrest; property freezing order (under POCA); worldwide freezing order (WFO) / freezing injunction

action of arrest; asset disclosure order; Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1935, The; Bankers Trust order; Coroner’s inquiry; crypto-asset; disclosure; Norwich Pharmacal order (NPO); search order; worldwide freezing order (WFO / freezing injunction

disclosure

immigration appeals

security for costs

· application for, required contents: Rule 12.48

· cesser and suspension of: s 29 Administration of Justice Act 1981

· Form HC24 (Application for Attachment of Earnings Order)

· jurisdiction to enforce judgment or order for the payment of money via: s 28 Administration of Justice Act 1981

· application, rules relating to: Rule 12.52

· commentary, Coren Law, Coren on Coroners – a whistle-stop tour (02.10.26)

· jurisdiction: para 3, Schedule 3, Administration of Justice Act 1981

contempt; Coroner of inquests; declaration of incompatibility; disclosure; doleance; guardian of minor’s estate; property freezing order (under POCA); recovery order (under POCA); statement of truth

· Civil Litigation Division, Manual of Guidance (10.24, updated 01.26)

costs

arrest and sale of land of execution debtor

court

· Request for a Copy of an Audio Recording of Isle of Man Court Proceedings

notice to prove a document

service

advocate, duties of; AI

· commentary, Coren Law, Deemsters’ Warning on Excessive Written Material (01.12.25)

· guidance (note – predates PD 01/2025): Pentera Trustees Ltd v Old Mutual International Isle of Man Ltd (ORD 2012/38) (30.04.15) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 68-71) (at § 68 citing Lord Roskill in Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 1030 in turn citing Lord Bingham LCJ, speaking extra-judicially at the First Symposium on Law Reporting, Legal Information and Electronic Media in the New Millennium in March 2000: “The essential starting point… is that… if it is not necessary to refer to a previous decision of the court, it is necessary not to refer to it. Similarly, if it is not necessary to include a previous decision in the bundle of authorities, it is necessary to exclude it. That approach will be rigidly enforced”)

· importance of citation of relevant Manx authorities not to be over-emphasised: Hillberry Trust Co. Ltd & another v Montpelier (Trust & Corporate) Services Ltd (in liquidation) (2DS 2023/21) (11.07.23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at §§ 16-17)

scrupulous fairness

· Practice Direction – Authorities and Bundles: PD 01/2025

· Danske Bank A/S v Irish Revenue Commissioners & others (CHP 2013/48) (27.11.13) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 20-21)

Asset disclosure order; Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1935, The

· jurisdiction of Bankers Trust Co. v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1274 recognised in Gelling Johnson Farrant (a firm) & PBC Corporate Services Ltd (CA 2003/6) (30.09.05) (Deemster Doyle at § 47) (“… though the court would not lightly use its powers to order disclosure of full information touching the confidential relationship of banker and customer an order for the production of documentation was justified even at the early interlocutory stages of an action where plaintiffs sought to trace funds which in equity belonged to them and of which there was strong evidence that they had been fraudulently deprived and delay might result in the dissipation of the funds before the action came to trial; and that in the then new and developing jurisdiction where neutral and innocent persons were under a duty to assist plaintiffs who were the victims of wrongdoing, the court would not hesitate to make strong orders to ascertain the whereabouts and prevent the disposal of such property; but that plaintiffs should be correspondingly bound to undertake that such information would be used only for the purposes of the action to trace the funds and not for any other purpose”)

Norwich Pharmacal order (NPO)

bank confidentiality

· s 7: (“On the application of any party to a legal proceeding a judge may order that such party be at liberty to inspect and take copies of any entries in a banker’s book for any of the purposes of such proceedings. An order under this section may be made either with or without summoning the bank or any other party, and shall be served on the bank three clear days before the same is to be obeyed, unless the judge otherwise directs.”)

o test (see Secilpar S.L. v Burgundy Consultants Ltd & another (CP 2003/128) (03.08.04) (§ 59) (“The court’s discretionary powers under section 7 of the 1935 Act to authorise the inspection of the bank account of a person who is not a party to the proceedings should be exercised only rarely and with great caution. The main intention of the Act was to relieve bankers from the necessity of attending court and producing their books and it should not be permitted to authorise a fishing expedition which would allow an intrusion into the private affairs of third parties”)

disclosure

· acts of: s 5 The Bankruptcy Code 1892

o s 5(e)(e) The Bankruptcy Code 1892 (“If a creditor has obtained a final judgment or final order against him for any amount, and, execution thereon not having been stayed, has served on him in the Isle of Man, or, by leave of the Court, elsewhere, a notice under section 5A of this Act, and he does not within 14 days after service of the notice, in case the service is effected in the Isle of Man, and in case the service is effected elsewhere, then within the time limited in that behalf by the order giving leave to effect the service, either comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he has a counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid, and which he could not set up in the action in which the judgment was obtained…”)

o s 5A The Bankruptcy Code 1892 (“A notice under section 5(ee) of this Act shall require the debtor to pay the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid in accordance with the terms of the judgment or order, or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor or the Court, and shall state the consequences of non-compliance with the notice”)

o s 8(3A) The Bankruptcy Code 1892 (“When the act of bankruptcy relied on is non-compliance with a notice under section 5(ee) of the Bankruptcy Code 1892 to pay, secure or compound for a judgment debt, or sum ordered to be paid, the Court may, if it thinks fit, stay or dismiss the petition on the ground that an appeal is pending from the judgment or order”)

adjudication order / bankruptcy order

· affidavit, creditor’s petition / claim to be verified by: s 8 The Bankruptcy Procedure Act 1892

o Lloyds Bank International Ltd v Alder (CHP 2014/51) (24.03.17) (High Bailiff Needham at §§ 75-77)

· conditions on which a creditor may petition: s 7 The Bankruptcy Procedure Act 1892

· consultation response document, Isle of Man Treasury, Consultation on Modernisation of Insolvency Law (02.23)

declaration of incompatibility

· general power of the court: s 4 The Bankruptcy Procedure Act 1892 (“The Court shall have full power to decide all questions of priorities, and all other questions whatsoever, whether of equity or law or fact, arising in any case of bankruptcy coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice, or making a complete distribution of property in any such case…”)

o guidance on discretion: Lloyds Bank International Ltd v Alder (CHP 2014/51) (27.04.18) (§§ 10-22) (High Bailiff Needham at § 19 citing the 10-point list cited by Chief Registrar Baister in HMRC v Garwood [2012] BPIR 575

o see also s 6 The Bankruptcy Procedure Act 1892

adjudication order / bankruptcy order

insolvency set-off; limitation

· proceedings to begin by way of petition, save where otherwise directed by the Code: s 6 Bankruptcy Code 1892

· recognition of foreign trustees in bankruptcy, principles on: Davie & Wood (as joint trustees in bankruptcy of Kamal Siddiqi, dec’d) (CHP 21/0068) (28.07.21) (Acting Deemster Gough at Appendix §§ 1-10); checklist: Re Brian Tomlinson (dec’d) (CP 2006/35) (26.07.06) (Deemster Doyle at § 38)

o commentary, Cains, Briefing Note – Recognition of Foreign Trustees in Bankruptcy in the Isle of Man (01.11.25)

o presumption removed that orders from Russia will be enforced: Rodionov v Dereva & others (CHP 22/0014) (14.07.22) (Deemster Corlett at § 7)

commentary, DQ, Isle of Man High Court Urgently Recognises English Joint Trustees in Bankruptcy (19.08.21)

· requirement for the High Court to assist courts having bankruptcy jurisdiction in any relevant country or territory: s 1(1) Bankruptcy Act 1988

· trial by jury of “any question of fact which any of the parties desire to be tried before a jury”: s 4 Bankruptcy Procedure Act 1892

universalism

· trustee in bankruptcy

o Practice Direction – Nomination of Trustee and Official Trustee in Petitions for Bankruptcy (PD 06/25)

o template witness statement providing consent and fitness to act as trustee / official trustee (click “Download file”)

matrimonial proceedings

· Boca Limited v VG Trustee Ltd (CHP 2018/65) (10.02.20) (Acting Deemster Rosen QC at § 24); Hallam v HMAG (CHP 25/00111) (30.07.26) (Deemster Corlett at § 126) (“… The production and delivery of a reserved judgment is an iterative process and it is open to any judge to alter his decision and/or any part or parts of his written judgment at any time up until an order reflecting the judgment has been sealed and issued to the parties (see Re L (Children) [2013] 1 WLR 634)”)

judgment

trustee’s application for assistance (‘Beddoe relief’)

· application for order for: Rule 12.53

· commentary, Gumbley, Manx Church Law

Partition Act 1931, applications under (for division / sale of land)

split trial

· application for directions for disposal of claim: Rule 13.9

Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1993, application under

fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty; particulars of claim

Manx customary law and breast law, development of

· application for registration of: para 6(1)(a), Schedule 12.1

· definition: para 12, Schedule 2, Anti-Terrorism and Crime Act 2003

· service of notice of registration of: para 8, Schedule 12.1

· variation or setting aside of registration of, application for: para 9(1)(b), Schedule 12.1

appeal; electronic bundle

· court may direct parties to use best endeavours to agree a bundle or bundles of documents for use at the hearing: para 23(1), Schedule 8.1

· guidance (note – pre-Practice Direction, below): Pentera Trustees Ltd v Old Mutual International Isle of Man Ltd (ORD 2012/38) (30.04.15) (§§ 66-67) (Deemster Corlett at § 66 citing dicta of Munby J, President of the Family Division, in Re L [2015] EWFC 15)

· Practice Direction – Authorities and Bundles: PD 01/2025

o “Agreed bundles for use at a hearing or trial should contain only those documents which are relevant and which it is necessary for the court to read, or which will actually be referred to during the hearing. Bundles should normally be indexed and contained in A4 size lever arch files with each file limited to no more than 350 sheets of single-sided A4 paper… Each page must be clearly numbered, with dividers clearly separating different categories of documents… The bundle must contain an agreed chronology of the key events. Consideration should be given to the production of a single short core bundle containing the really important documents to which reference is made in the skeleton arguments. Bundles should be clearly labelled and numbered, both on the outside and inside of the file, with a label showing who has produced them and with the date of the hearing clearly marked”.

Sedley’s Laws of Documents; trial bundles

· borne by Claimant, to the civil standard (balance of probabilities): Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Ltd & others (CHP 13/0066) (21.08.23) (Acting Deemster Rosen KC at § 79 c); see also Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/11) (05.12.17) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 456-458) (on competing probabilities)

care order; contempt; default judgment; doleance; exclusive jurisdiction clause; forum non conveniens; inferences; limitation; service out of the jurisdiction

· definition of: Rule 2.29(2)

deemed date of service

· guidance: Shepherd v Wells (ORD 2017/48) (20.05.20) (§§ 15-16) (Deemster Needham at § 15, citing Jackson LJ in Fox v Foundation Piling Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 790: “parties are quite entitled to make Calderbank offers outside the framework of [Part 7, Chapter 6]. Where a party makes such an offer and then achieves a more advantageous result, the court’s discretion is wider. Nevertheless it may well be appropriate to order the party which has optimistically rejected the Calderbank offer to pay all costs since the date when that offer expired”)

offer to settle

doleance

Capacity Act 2023; Enduring Power of Attorney (EPA); Mental Health Act 1998, applications under; mental health receiver; testamentary capacity

· Consultation on Draft Code of Practice (07.08.26)

· Article 8 ECHR, impact of in care proceedings: X v DHSC & others (2DS 00/00) (sic) (23.06.17) (§§ 163-176) (see also guidance on the role of the court, below)

· burden of proof is on the Department for Health and Social Care: X v DHSC & others, above (§ 142)

child / children

· definition: s 31(1)(1)(a) Children and Young Persons Act 2001 (CYPA) (“an order… placing the child in the care of the Department”)

· delay: “In… proceedings… with respect to the upbringing of a child…, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay… is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child”: s 1(2) CYPA

· findings of fact: X v DHSC & others, above (§ 142) (citing Munby LJ in Re A (A Child) (Fact-finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12, [2011] 1 FLR 1817 (“… findings of fact must be based on evidence (including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence) and not on suspicion or speculation”)

· Form C1 (Application for an Order) (for example: Residence, Contact, Prohibited Steps, Specific Issue) (click “Download file”)

· guidance on the role of the court in intractable contact disputes: X v Y (FAM 2013/90) (16.10.13) (§§ 19-25) (including Strasbourg jurisprudence) (Deemster Corlett at § 22 citing Re W [2012] EWCA Civ 999 on principles which apply when refusing parental contact)

· interim order: s 35 CYPA

· jurisdiction: s 31(2) CYPA (‘threshold criteria’) (ie. “that the child is suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm”: s 31(2)(a); and “that the harm is or will be attributable to – (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child’s being beyond parental control”: s 31(2)(b)); X v DHSC & others, below (§§ 141-147)

· promotion of upbringing of children by their families: “Subject to subsections (1) and (2), a court in any proceedings referred to in subsection (2) shall seek, so far as practicable, to promote the upbringing of children by their families; and for this purpose “family”, in relation to a child, includes any individual who has parental responsibility for him and any person with whom he has been living”: s 1(3) CYPA

o X v DHSC & others, above (§ 159) (“Tynwald, during the passage of the CYPA, a large portion of the text of which is virtually identical to the Children Act 1989 (an Act of HM Government of UK, applicable in England and Wales) saw fit to insert a hugely important provision notably absent from its counterpart in England and Wales”)

Rules of the High Court (Family Proceedings) 2009

· Scott Schedule, will be very useful to the court in all but the most simple of cases: X v DHSC & others, above (§ 314)

· welfare of the child: “When a court determines any question with respect to — (a) the upbringing of a child, or (b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from it, the welfare of that child shall be the court’s paramount consideration”: s 1(1) CYPA

· ‘welfare checklist’: s 1(4) CYPA

· David Doyle, Case Law on the Rules of the High Court of Justice 2009 (as at 28.03.22)

Rules of the High Court of Justice 2009

active case management

Ordinary Procedure

appeal

chronology; list of issues

· Practice Direction – Case Summaries for Applications (PD 03/2025)

o applies to: “any Application that has been listed for directions in complex matters or matters other than straightforward ones”

o key requirements: (“a) Set out a brief summary of the claim; b) Indicate[s] the issues of fact which are agreed or in dispute; c) Not exceed 500 words; and d) Be prepared by the Applicant and agreed by the other side where possible. Such agreement to be indicated in the covering letter when filing”) (note – whilst not part of PD 03/2025, a list of (legal) issues in dispute is also helpful: see list of issues)

· requirement to include in trial bundle: Rule 9.1(b)

admission

·  guidance on: Evans v Hanrahan & others (SUM 2011/20) (26.06.15) (§§ 3-10) (High Bailiff Needham citing at §§ 5-6 dicta from Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] A.C. 794 on pre-existing vulnerability)

split trial

limitation

abuse of process

service

litigation friend

· commentary, Coren Law, Freezing Injunctions in the Isle of Man – Practice and Procedure (12.25)

· principles on: Illumination International LLC v VHGL & others (ORD 23/0034) (09.01.24) (§§ 19-21) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 19, applying Cruz City, below: “… The Chabra jurisdiction may be exercised where there is good reason to suppose that assets held in the name of a Defendant against whom the Claimant asserts no cause of action (the NCAD) would be amenable to some process, ultimately enforceable by the courts by which the assets would be available to satisfy a judgment against a Defendant whom the Claimant asserts to be liable on his substantive claim. The test of “good reason to suppose” is to be equated with good arguable case and in such cases the jurisdiction will be exercised where it is just and convenient to do so. The jurisdiction should be exercised with caution and should not operate oppressively against innocent third parties who are not substantive defendants and who have not acted to frustrate the administration of justice”); Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings Ltd v Unitech Ltd & another (CHP 2013/66) (06.02.15) (Deemster Doyle at §§ 17-31)

open justice; private, hearing in

· commentary, Keystone Law, Is litigation funding legal in the Isle of Man? (21.04.22)

liquidator / provisional liquidator; litigation funding

acknowledgment of service

· characteristics of: Rule 5.19 (“(a) the legal basis for the claim is to be set out in the claim form; (b) no statements of case, apart from the claim form, are to be filed or served; (c) unless the court requires or permits oral evidence to be given, only written evidence is to be given; (d) all written evidence is to be filed and served; (e) default judgment may not be given…”)

· claims for which Chancery Procedure the normal procedure: Rule 5.2(4) (“the claimant seeks the court’s decision on a question which is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact, and (b) the small claims procedure is not the normal procedure”); Schedule 5.1 (category headings: “1 Commercial… 2 Administrative… 3 Land… 4 Injunctions… 5 Criminal… 6 Miscellaneous”)

o “6 Miscellaneous… [a]pplication relating to a trust or a deceased person’s estate within Rule 13.35“

· directions questionnaire, claimant to file / serve within 7 days of being served with the acknowledgment of service or within 7 days of expiry of the time for filing, unless otherwise directed: Rule 5.22(2) (note – little used in practice)

· directions, when court may give: Rule 5.22(1) (“The court may give directions immediately when, or at any time after, a claim form is issued, either on the application of a party or on its own initiative”)

· Form HC3 (Claim Form) (Chancery)

· Form HC3A (Notes for Claimant) (Chancery)

· Form HC3B (Notes for Defendant) (Chancery)

· issue of claim form without naming a defendant: Rule 5.20

o example: Re: Kenichi Machida (as trustee in bankruptcy of Shingi Nishida) (CHP 2014/103) (04.12.14)

· objection to use of Chancery Procedure: Rule 5.21

o McNally v Sodzawiczny & others (CHP 2020/121) (17.06.21) (Deemster Corlett at § 9 & §§ 17-21)

transfer to another procedure

Partition Act 1931, applications under (for division / sale of land)

advocate

· HCG11 How do I apply for a charging order?

interim charging order

· jurisdiction: s 14A & Schedule 2A Administration of Justice Act 1981; Rules 12.37-12.46

· jurisdiction (general) to enforce judgment or order for the payment of money via: Rule 12.2(1)(d)

adoption order; assessment order; care order; emergency protection order (EPO); family proceedings; financial provision orders; guardian; guardian of minor’s estate

· Isle of Man Children’s Services Procedures Manual (updated 25.06.24)

minor; residence order; special guardianship order; supervision order; UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989

· assistance to court, if agreed: McCluskey v DHA & another (CHP 2019/116) (13.02.20) (Deemster Corlett at § 6: “An agreed chronology would have assisted me…”); FSA v Louis & others (CHP 2016/73) (08.04.19) (Acting Deemster Rosen QC at § 295: “agreed chronology”)

case summary

· trial bundle to contain “a case summary and, if appropriate, a chronology”: Rule 9.5(1)(b)

inferences

authorities, citation of

· Isle of Man Courts & Tribunals Service, Annual Report 2025 (p. 6)

· constitution of: s 2(1)(a) High Court Act 1991

· Grover v Wilton Group Ltd (CHP 26/0007) (07.07.26) (Acting Deemster Cope at § 82)

· glossary (explanation of legal phrases used in the CPR)

· one of main reasons for introducing the RHCJ was for Manx courts to benefit from the CPR and decisions under the CPR: Hudson v DoH (SUM 2012/71) (01.05.13) (Deemster Corlett at § 12: “… one of the main reasons for the introduction was so that we could rely on English authority, bearing in mind always that the Court has an overriding ability in certain cases, where there is good reason, not to follow those decisions”)

o VTB Bank PJSC & another v Mazurov & others (ORD 19/0042) (04.12.24) (Deemster Corlett at § 28: “… It is in my judgment still most important that, when considering Manx Rules of Court which are in all material respects identical to those in the Civil Procedure Rules, Manx courts should follow the relevant English case law”)

o see Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets PLC v Wilmot & another (ORD 24/0042) (12.12.25) (Acting Deemster Wild at § 22: “… I am not convinced that I need to look at another Rule or apply another test in order to exercise my discretion under Rule 10.35. The whole point of introducing the RHC was that the Rules were far more specific than the old Isle of Man Rules of Court and that, in most cases, applications could be considered by analysing the clear meaning of the words in the rules rather than delving into caselaw relating to other rules. I do not consider that the Denton test adds anything to my analysis…”)

English (and other) precedent

· Attorney General’s Chambers, Practical Guidance for Requesting Authorities, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and Asset Recovery in the Isle of Man (updated 11.07.24) (see p. 6)

extended civil restraint order; general civil restraint order; limited civil restraint order (LCRO); totally without merit (TWM)

· address of claimant (where claimant resides or carries on business), must be included, in addition to his address for service: Rule 6.11(1)

· address of defendant (where defendant resides or carries on business, so far as known to the claimant, and where the defendant is an individual) must be included: Rule 6.11(2)

Chancery Procedure

· claimant, notes for (Form HC1A – Notes for Claimant)

company; coroner

· date of issue of: Rule 4.2

· defendant, notes for: Form HC1B (Notes for Defendant)

doleance

· Form HC1 (Claim Form (general))

particulars of claim; statement of case

· petition: any statutory requirement for proceedings to be started by, shall be construed as a requirement to be started by issue of a claim form in accordance with the Rules: Rule 4.1(6) but see Rule 7.5(3) (“Any statutory requirement that an application in proceedings be made by petition or motion shall be construed as a requirement that it be made in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)”) (and Wallis v Soberano Ltd (2DS 2014/21) (22.04.15) (§ 24)

· service: see Coroner

· service on advocate: Rule 2.36 (“Where the defendant is represented by an advocate and the conditions in rule 2.25 are fulfilled, the claim form must be served by leaving it at the business address of the defendant’s advocate”)

service out of the jurisdiction; statement of case

· statement of value to be included in money claim: Rule 6.10

· time limit to serve on defendant: Rule 4.3(1)-(2) (within 4 months of issue)

o extension of time to serve: Rule 4.4; guidance on: Principal Contracts Ltd (in voluntary liquidation) acting by its liquidator Craig Mitchell v Rowe & others (ORD 23/0024) (14.01.25) (§§ 18-23, summary at § 23) (see  Deemster Corlett at § 48 on funding issues / WP negotiations: “… The English precedents, which I intend to follow, specifically the Court of Appeal… in Cecil v Bayat, make it clear that funding issues do not provide any good reason for an extension of the period for the service of the claim form. The desire to start or progress without prejudice negotiations similarly does not seem to me to provide a proper basis… The correct procedure is to serve the claim form and then apply for a case management stay“); see Hudson v DoH (SUM 2012/71) (01.05.13) (§§ 4-10) (Deemster Corlett at § 7, citing May LJ in Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2000] EWCA Civ B526: “The discretionary power… to extend time periods at Rule 3.1(2)(a) (the Manx equivalent being 7.2(2)(a)) does not apply because of the introductory words. The general words of Rule 3.10 (our equivalent being Rule 2.5) cannot extend to enable the Court to do what Rule 7.6(3) specifically forbids, nor to extend time when the specific provisions of the Rules which enable extensions of time specifically does not extend to making this extension of time”)

appeal (a similar point in the context of an appeal)

· time limit to serve on defendant if serving out of the jurisdiction: Rule 4.3(3) (within 6 months of issue)

claim form

· commentary, Coren Law, English High Court refuses to wind up deadlocked Isle of Man company (13.09.26)

· Coren Law, Welcome to Click on Coren on Isle of Man Civil Procedure (12.25); Isle of Man Today, Coren Law launches Isle of Man’s first online civil procedure portal | iomtoday.co.im (02.01.26)

· Coren Law, About Click (12.25) (video) (see “About CLICK”)

advocate, duties of

· statistics (Written Answer, 14.10.25) (25 clinical negligence claims received since the inception of Manx Care on 01.04.21)

abuse of process

disclosure (see “implied undertaking”)

· exceptions to the rule that a party to whom a document has been disclosed may use it only for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is disclosed: Rule 7.51(1) (“(a) the document has been read to or by the court, or referred to, at a hearing which has been held in public; (b) the court gives permission; or (c) the party who disclosed the document and the person to whom the document belongs agree”)

o considered in IOTA Violet LLC v Woman LLC (2015/0039) (21.12.15) (Acting Deemster Gough at §§ 13 & 19)

privilege

anti-suit injunction

· guidance on: AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd & Others [2011] UKPC 7 (10.03.11) (Lord Collins at § 101: “… there is no rule that the English court (or Manx court) will not examine the question whether the foreign court or the foreign court system is corrupt or lacking in independence. The rule is that considerations of international comity will militate against any such finding in the absence of cogent evidence”); see also Danske Bank A/S v Irish Revenue Commissioners & others (CHP 2013/48) (27.11.13) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 10-17)

contempt

· warrant for arrest of person against whom order for committal made shall not, without further order of the court, be enforced more than 2 years after the date made: Rule 12.65

· see, for example, Jardine Strategic Ltd v Oasis Investments II Master Fund Ltd & 80 others (No. 2) [2025] UKPC 34 (24.07.25) (at § 53)

· commentary, Coren Law, Communications with the Court – new Rule 2.63 (16.02.26)

Court

· extension of time: Rule 194 (“The Court may, in any case in which it shall see fit, extend or abridge the time appointed by the rules or fixed by any order of the Court for doing any act or taking any proceeding”)

Rules of the High Court of Justice (RHCJ); winding-up order

appeal

· applications under Companies Acts 1931 to 1992, Companies Act 2006 or Limited Liability Companies Act 1996 (claims for which Chancery Procedure the normal procedure): para 1(a), Schedule 5.1

Articles of association, construction of

· claim by a company must be initiated through an advocate: KPMG v Chaldan Ltd (2DS 2011/11) (01.05.01) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Acting Deemster King QC at § 10) (ie. other than in Small Claims Procedure); applied in Ballacorey Wheat Ltd v Barclays Bank plc (2DS 2022/32-34) (04.04.23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Moran KC at § 79: “… the failure to have the claim form signed by a Manx advocate is a fundamental breach of Manx law and procedure which it was not possible to allow rectification or correction of, under Rule 2.5…”)

Small Claims Procedure

· deadlocked company

o commentary, Coren Law, English High Court refuses to wind up deadlocked Isle of Man company (13.09.26)

· default in relation to the Companies Acts, power of Court to require rectification of: s 26(4) Companies Act 1992

o Department for Enterprise v AGR Motorsport Ltd & another (CHP 25/0086) (17.04.26) (Deemster Needham at § 14)

derivative claim; directors, duties of; disclosure; disqualification order;

· enforcement of duty of company to make returns to Department: s 285 Companies Act 1931

o Department for Enterprise v AGR Motorsport Ltd & another (CHP 25/0086) (17.04.26) (Deemster Needham at § 14)

execution of contract by company; execution of instrument by person nominated by High Court; liquidator / provisional liquidator; minority shareholder oppression claim

· personal service on: Rule 2.26(3) (“A document is served personally on a company or other corporation by leaving it with a person holding a senior position in the corporation”)

· representation of at trial: Rule 9.6 (“Without prejudice to rule 5.10 [see below], a company or other corporation may be represented at trial by an officer or employee if — (a) the officer or employee has been authorised by the company or corporation to appear at the trial on its behalf; and (b) the court gives permission”); see also s 36 Administration of Justice Act 1981 (“any of the following persons may address the court… (c) where a partnership, body corporate or association of persons is a party to the proceedings, any member of that partnership, or any director or officer of that body corporate, or any member or officer of that association, who is allowed by leave of the court to appear on behalf of that partnership, body corporate or association, as the case may be”)

o permission revoked: Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 21/0028) (05.10.23) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 24: “The letter of 24 August 2023 signed electronically by Mr Ruhan and Mr Bryce, contains some bizarre and indeed untrue statements. It states that the court would not hear from Treehouse IOM without a Manx advocate being appointed and that its directors would not be allowed to make representations on its behalf. This is totally untrue. At the hearing on 7 August 2023 the court specifically granted permission for Mr Ruhan to address the court on behalf of Treehouse IOM. The letter also referred to claims “soon to be heard before an English High Court “later this year””. Mr Novak explains why this is untrue and I accept what he says. Further, it was said in the letter that “it has also been made apparent that until the English trials have concluded that this court will not hear our evidence…. This again is blatantly untrue. The 7 August 2023 order specifically permitted Treehouse IOM and Mr Ruhan and Mr Bryce to lodge evidence in opposition to the outstanding application. In light of these misstatements the permission for Mr Ruhan to speak for the company is revoked”)

o representation of corporation by “nominated individual” (defined at Rule 5.10(2)): Rule 5.10(1) who may: “(a) take such steps and sign such statements of case and other documents on behalf of the corporation as are necessary for, or relate to, the commencement of relevant proceedings…; (b) represent the corporation in any relevant proceedings; (c) appear and be heard in any relevant proceedings; and (d) sign all statements of case and other documents relating to relevant proceedings…”)

restoration of a company to the register; right of audience; scheme of arrangement; security for costs; service; share register, application for rectification of; Small Claims Procedure; statement of truth; winding-up order

· commentary, Coren Law, Proposed Changes to the High Court Act 1991 (12.25) (update: Second Reading 13.01.26) Clauses: 03 Feb 2026, 10 Feb 2026 (Amendments: Am 1; Cl 56; New Clause 1 (moved in detail) Am 4); Third Reading: 24.02.26; Final Stage: 31.03.26; Consideration of Council Amendments: 28.04.26); Coren Law, Update on Manx High Court’s powers to compel evidence (23.09.26)

witness summons

· definition of “not competent as a witness“: s 13(2) Administration of Justice Act 2008

hearsay evidence

limitation

tribunals

particulars of claim

particulars of claim

· conduct for avoiding: Rule 9, Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

· definition: Rule 2.1(e), Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024

admission; ancillary relief order, power to vary; appeal

· guidance on consent orders and the court’s power to vary agreed terms: Bridson v Moore (CHP 2012/86) (25.01.13) (§§ 13-21) (High Bailiff Needham citing at § 13 Pannone LLP v Aardvark Digital Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 803) (§ 18: “… save for an application of the general law of contract, the court has no general power to vary the terms set out in the recitals part of the Consent Order under rule 7.2(7)…”); applied and summarised in Abbey Properties Ltd v Acorn Holdings PCC Ltd & another (SUM 19/11) (01.07.21) (Deemster Needham at § 7: “i) the Deed of Agreement is to be construed as a commercial instrument; (ii) the court is not concerned with determining subjective intentions of the parties; and (iii) the court applies an objective approach in ascertaining the contextual meaning of the relevant contractual language using the text of the agreement and the relevant contextual scene”)

matrimonial proceedings

· rules on consent judgments and orders: Rule 10.7

o see also para 6, Schedule 7.1, including:

o “Where all parties affected by an order have written to the court consenting to the making of the order a draft of which has been filed with the court , the court shall treat the draft as having been signed…” (para 6(1)); and

o obligation to inform court “immediately” upon agreement of an application or order, if a hearing has been fixed (para 6(3))

· commentary, Coren Law, The “ancient” Fraudulent Assignments Act 1736 reviewed by Isle of Man High Court in Mazurov (31.05.26); Coren Law, Just my Lux: unlawful means conspiracy claims, after Lux Films (22.08.26); Coren Law, Cryptocurrency fraud, civil law and the Isle of Man (30.08.26)

economic torts; fraud, allegation of

· guidance: Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Limited v Cains Advocates Ltd (ORD 2010/53) (06.01.12) (Deemster Doyle at §§ 64-70); upheld on appeal: Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Cains Advocates Ltd (2DS 2012/1) (09.08.13) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Acting Deemster Moran QC at §§ 212 & 234); Hillberry Trust Company Ltd v Gautrey & another (ORD 2018.13) (21.01.21) (Deemster Corlett at § 52 “conspiracy is… actionable only where loss can be proved. Loss is integral to the cause of action”); VTB Bank (PJSC) & another v Mazurov & others (ORD 19/0042) (28.05.26) (Deemster Corlett at § 102 citing JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov [2018] UKSC 19) (per Lord Sumption & Lord Lloyd-Jones at § 10: “What is it that makes the conspiracy actionable as such? To say that a predominant purpose of injuring the claimant in the one case and the use of unlawful means in the other supply the element of unlawfulness required to make a conspiracy tortious simply restates the proposition in other words. A more useful concept is the absence of just cause or excuse… A person has a right to advance his own interests by lawful means even if the foreseeable consequence is to damage the interests of others. The existence of that right affords a just cause or excuse. Where, on the other hand, he seeks to advance his interests by unlawful means he has no such right. The position is the same where the means used are lawful but the predominant intention of the defendant was to injure the claimant rather than to further some legitimate interest of his own. This is because in that case it cannot be an answer to say that he was simply exercising a legal right. He had no interest recognised by the law in exercising his legal right for the predominant purpose not of advancing his own interests but of injuring the claimant. In either case, there is no just cause or excuse for the combination”)

particulars of claim

· commentary, MNH, Library and archives, Constitutional History of the Isle of Man 

· House of Commons Justice Committee, Crown Dependencies: Developments since 2010 (Tenth Report of Session 2013-14) (16.01.14); Ministry of Justice, Government Response to the Justice Select Committee’s Report ‘Crown Dependencies: developments since 2010’ (03.14)

·  House of Commons Justice Committee, The Constitutional Relationship with the Crown Dependencies (Second Report of Session 2023-24) (28.03.24); House of Commons Justice Committee, The constitutional relationship with the Crown Dependencies: Government Response (First Special Report of Session 2024–25)

Royal Assent

· guidance: Whitley v Ascot Hotel Ltd (21.34) (27.01.22) (§§ 56-60) (EET Chairman Stewart at § 56: citing Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1977] EWCA Civ 165) (“There must be a breach of contract by the employer. The breach must be sufficiently serious to warrant resignation. The employee must leave as a consequence of that breach and not for some other reason. The employee must not delay.”)

· ‘last straw’ doctrine: Kennington v PSC (20/32) (15.06.22) (EET Chairman Stewart at §§ 322-325)

tribunals

service out of the jurisdiction

limitation (see Table 8)

· application for committal: Rule 12.62

· burden of proof (criminal standard): Templeton Insurance Ltd v Taylor (ORD 2019/016) (11.07.19) (Deemster Corlett at § 13)

· commentary, Coren Law, Isle of Man Civil Contempt – Practice & Procedure (25.04.26)

· consultation (closed 27.10.25) on draft Contempt of Court Bill 2025

judgment

· jurisdiction to commit for contempt: Rule 12.61

o court’s power to order committal of its own volition, against a person guilty of contempt of court, not to be affected by Part 12, Chapter 9: Rule 12.61

o contempt of court committed in connection with any proceedings before the court: order for committal may only be made by a Deemster: Rule 12.61(2)

· principles: Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 2021/0028) (29.11.23) (unrep.) (Acting Deemster Gough at §§ 29-35); Gubay v Drower (CP 2004/36) (02.11.04) (Deemster Kerruish citing at § 24 the SOGD in In re Barr and Anglo International Holdings Ltd 1990-92 MLR 398 (“… the law of contempt… in the Isle of Man still derived from common law alone – that is, in practice, such of the English common law of contempt as had been preserved by Parliament when it instituted statutory rules in England…”) (p 410); Gubay v Drower (CP 2004/36) (12.11.04) (Deemster Kerruish at § 30) (“Committal to custody ought to be a last resort sanction. However, the courts should not shy from imposing such sanction in appropriate cases”); Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/0011) (13.06.19) (Deemster Corlett at § 7)

· sentence, maximum: Templeton Insurance Ltd v Taylor (ORD 2019/0016) (11.09.19) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 8-9); Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 2021/0028) (unrep.) (15.05.24) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 5: “In fixing the penalties for the contempt I have had regard to the guidelines referred to in HMAG v [Crosland] [2021] UKSC 15…”)

· service of application for committal: Rule 12.62(4) (“Unless the court otherwise directs, a copy of the notice or claim form, accompanied by a copy of the affidavit in support of the application, must be served personally on the person sought to be committed”)

statement of truth; witness

· Table 3: Sentencing for civil contempt – examples

litigation funding

· Rules 2.1(g) & 11 Advocates’ Practice Rules 2024 (query whether Article 6 ECHR compatible )

o Treasury v Irving & another (ORD 2013/19) (10.10.18) (Deemster Corlett at § 18: CFA’s “probably unlawful as a matter of Manx law”)

· Andrew Langan-Newton, George Johnson Law Prize essay: “The options open to civil litigants of modest means are now so limited that no win, no fee or similar litigation funding agreements must be introduced in the Island to provide access to justice” (29.11.24)

· Form HCC

arbitration agreement; consent order; contingency fee agreements (CFA’s); conduct, agreement by; exclusive jurisdiction clause; interpretation; limitation (see Table 8); misrepresentation, allegation of; oral agreement, claim based on; particulars of claim; service out of the jurisdiction; specific performance; standstill agreement; written agreement, claim based on

expert determination

·  guidance on, as a dispute resolution mechanism: Boca Ltd v Volaw Trustee Ltd & another (CHP 2018/65) (06.12.19) (Acting Deemster Rosen QC at §§ 122-131)

interpretation

· maxim that: “the contract should be interpreted so that it is valid rather than ineffective” (verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam pereat): Willers v Nugent & another (2DS 2018/2) (15.06.18) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC, Deemster Doyle & Acting Deemster Sir Michael Birt QC at § 71); see Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38) (at § 95)

· onerous clauses: see MS Amlin Marine NV v King Trader Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1387; for earlier authority, see Nedbank Private Wealth Ltd v Alder & others (ORD 2017/8) (02.08.18) (Deemster Needham at § 57) (see also ss 6(1) & 13(1) Misrepresentation and Unfair Contract Terms Act 1980)

· defendant who has filed acknowledgment of service or defence may make an additional claim for a contribution or indemnity against another defendant: Rule 6.50(1)

damages

· s 1(1) Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1946 (“Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly the fault of any other person or persons … the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such an extent as the Court thinks just and equitable having regard to the Claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage”)

o guidance: Ault v Corlett (ORD 2012/39) (10.03.14) (Acting Deemster Morris at § 125: “there are two aspects to apportioning responsibility between Claimant and Defendant, namely the respective “causative potency” of what each of the parties have done, and their respective blameworthiness: See Denning LJ (as he then was) in Davies v Swan Motor Co. Ltd [1949] 2KB 291 approved by the House of Lords in Fitzgerald v Lane [1989] AC 328“)

· admissible in evidence in civil proceedings where relevant: s 11 Civil Evidence Act 1973

· guidance to practitioners: Deemster Corlett & Acting Deemster Gough, Managing Excessive Material in Commercial Litigation, Seminar Notes (Seminar, 04.11.25) (“The court expects matters which are capable of reasonable agreement between the parties (such as the settling of the finite terms of orders) to be agreed”)

o commentary, Coren Law, Deemsters’ Warning on Excessive Written Material (12.25)

· parties in dispute over purely procedural issues required to co-operate: Isis Investments Ltd (In Liquidation) v Kaupthing Finance EHF & others (CHP 2012/1) (07.06.12) (§§ 37-39) (Deemster Doyle at § 39: “… they are required to co-operate in making a real attempt to explore the significant narrowing of, or compromise of, the procedural dispute for the purpose of avoiding disproportionate expense and the taking up of excessive court time”)

· there should be more co-operation and less confrontation between litigants and advocates: Shepherds Select Funds plc & another v Abraham & others (CHP 2012/57) (22.05.12) (Deemster Doyle at § 63)

arrest and sale of goods of execution debtor; arrest and sale of land of execution debtor

· claim form, coroner to serve: Rule 2.37

o coroner to serve notice (certificate of service) on claimant, who must file: Rule 2.38(1)

o guidance on permitted method of service: Tower Credit Ltd v Dadds & another (SUM 2010/16) (30.01.17) (§§ 31-37) (High Bailiff Needham citing at § 33 Dyson LJ in Cranfield v Bridgegrove Ltd [2003] 1 WLR 2441 and at § 35 Dyson LJ in Collier v Williams [2006] EWCA Civ 20)

o notice of non-service: Rule 2.34

· Code of Conduct for Coroners (updated 17.03.25)

· commentary, Coren Law, Coren on Coroners – a whistle-stop tour (02.10.26)

· coroner entitled to collection fee and sale fee under Coroners Fees Order 2023 (note – now the Treasury Fees (Amendment) Order 2026): Barclays Bank Plc v Failte Property Ltd (ORD 2022/0020) (21.12.23) (Deemster Corlett at § 25)

· (from 01.04.26) Treasury Fees (Amendment) Order 2026

Enforcement Rules 1982

· entitlement of coroner to poundage once execution “in the hands of” the coroner: letter, Chief Registrar to Isle of Man Law Society and others (19.06.24), attaching letter from former Chief Registrar (21.01.91)

enforcement; execution / execution order

Glenfaba, jurisdiction of Coroner of: see extract of Kneale, Manx Coroners, quoted in Valedictory Ceremony on the Retirement of Gordon Leece (27.06.19)

· jurisdiction of: s 2 Coroners Act 1983

· liability: s 11(1) Administration of Justice Act 1981 (“Neither a Coroner nor a lockman shall be liable to be sued for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the exercise or purported exercise of their functions under this Act unless the Coroner or lockman wilfully or negligently failed to comply with the provisions of this Act”)

· obstruction of: wilful obstruction of Coroner in the performance of his duties an offence (s 16 Administration of Justice Act 1981)

· office: Barclays Bank PLC v Failte Property Ltd (ORD 22/0020) (21.12.23) (Deemster Corlett at § 11)

wilful obstruction or impeding of: s 16 Administration of Justice Act 1981

service

· commentary, M&P Legal, Inquest Process in the Isle of Man (27.04.26)

· Coroners of Inquests Rules 1988

· Coroner’s officer: see Isle of Man Constabulary, Coroner’s Officer

· courts.im, Coroner of Inquests

· decisions and verdicts of

· duty to hold inquest: s 6 Coroners of Inquests Act 1987

o “where the body of the deceased is in the Island and the coroner has reason to believe that he died in the Island in any of the circumstances mentioned in [s] 2(1)(a) or (b) or (4)(d)”: s 6(1)(a)

o “where the Attorney General has reason to believe that the deceased died (in the Island or elsewhere) in circumstances which in his opinion make the holding of an inquest desirable, and directs the coroner to hold such an inquest”: s 6(1)(c); Hallam v HMAG (CHP 25/0111) (30.07.26) 

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

· High Bailiff: s 1(1) Coroners of Inquests Act 1987

· misadventure verdict: Hallam v HMAG (CHP 25/0111) (30.07.26) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 38-54)

· power to hold inquest: s 5 Coroners of Inquests Act 1987

· power to issue a summons to any person to give evidence: s 7(1) Coroners of Inquests Act 1987

· power to summon a jury: s 8(1) Coroners of Inquests Act 1987

· questions for Coroner: Re. Solway Harvester (SC/2008) (08.11.08) (Coroner Moyle: “I am endeavouring to answer four very important questions, namely the identity of the persons who lost their lives, when they lost their lives, where they lost their lives, and how they lost their lives”)

· standard of proof in respect of factual finding (civil standard): Inquest into the death of Alan Connor (INQ 2024/27) (06.08.24) (§ 3)

· verdicts, range of potential: Inquest into the death of Stephen Michael Glover (SC 2020/44) (18.09.20) (Coroner of Inquests Hughes at §§ 20-32: unlawful killing, suicide, accidental death/misadventure, open verdict, narrative verdict, neglect)

arrest and sale of land of execution debtor

Enforcement Rules 1982; execution debtor

appeal

· Attorney General’s Chambers, costs against opposing unsuccessful parties: Baccarat Ltd & another v Cabinet Office (CHP21/002 (ORD24/0038 & ORD24/0041) (04.04.25) (Deemster Corlett at § 17: “… It has been the case for as long as can reasonably be recalled that salaried advocates in the Attorney General’s Chambers when representing a governmental entity have successfully claimed and been awarded costs against opposing unsuccessful parties. As all advocates should know, those costs are generally claimed at a quite significant discount compared to the costs recoverable by those in private practice… ”) (note – PTA application dismissed: Baccarat Ltd & another v Cabinet Office (2DS 2025/010) (30.07.25))

· basis of assessment

o standard costs

o costs which are allowed: Rule 11.4(2)(a) (“(a) only costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue shall be allowed; and (b) any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or reasonable and proportionate in amount shall be resolved in favour of the paying party”)

o relevant factors: whether costs were: “(i) proportionately and reasonably incurred; or (ii) proportionate and reasonable in amount”) (Rule 11.5(1)(a))

o indemnity costs

o costs which are allowed: Rule 11.4(3) (“Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the indemnity basis, any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount shall be resolved in favour of the receiving party”)

o indemnity costs checklist of questions: Clucas Food Service Ltd & Ice Mann Ltd v Salmon & Salmon (CPL 2004/6) (15.12.05) (Deemster Doyle at § 40). See also:

o “… something… which takes the case outside the norm”: Carter & another v Irving & another (2DS 2017/24) (19.02.18) (§§ 9-10) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Rosen QC at § 9: “There must… be something – whether it be the conduct of the claimant or the circumstances of the case – which takes the case outside the norm…”) (applying dicta cited in Hirandani v Hirco plc (2DS 2014/2) (06.11.14)); see Doddington v Isle of Man Orthodontics Ltd (SUM 24/0068) (22.05.25) (Deputy High Bailiff Arrowsmith at §§ 33-34)

o commentary, Callin Wild, Court considers the law and test in awarding indemnity costs (12.06.25)

o whether party has “crossed the line”: Re Global Steel Holdings Ltd (in Liquidation) (CHP 2018/31) (31.05.19) (Deemster Corlett at § 8)

o proportionality, relevance of: Highlights Holdings Ltd v SMP Partners Ltd (CHP 2019/33) (17.07.19) (Deemster Corlett at § 27: “I also remind myself that proportionality as such is not directly relevant to an indemnity costs order as it is in relation to an award of costs on the standard basis”); but contrast Boca Ltd v VG Trustee Ltd & another (CHP 2018/65) (10.02.20) (§§ 55-59) (Acting Deemster Rosen QC at § 56: “If ever there was a case where indemnity costs should be ordered and where proportionality should still be considered in the assessment, it is this case…”) (at § 59, the court directed proportionality to be taken into account)

o relevant factors: whether costs were: “(i) unreasonably incurred; or (ii) unreasonable in amount” (Rule 11.5(1)(b))

o Table 4: Conduct resulting in indemnity costs orders – examples

· costs – general

o assessment of costs, where costs ordered, is either summary assessment by the court or detailed assessment by a costs officer, unless any rule or enactment provides otherwise: Rule 11.7

o fair and reasonable, recoverable fees  “not more than those allowed on assessment… as being fair and reasonable”: s 20(2) Advocates Act 1995

o costs-only orders, leave to appeal required

appeal

o costs warning, when adding may amount to unreasonable conduct: “… it is at least arguable that for any [Employment and Equality Tribunal] Respondent without clear grounds to allege vexatious etc misconduct under Rule 40(3)(a) (i) [of the Employment and Equality Tribunal Rules 2018] and then also adding a costs warning, may itself be behaving in a manner which is unreasonable” (Taylor v Manx Care (2025-19) (03.09.25) (EET Chairman Stewart at § 31)

o counsel’s fees (see also “instructing solicitor’s fees”, below)

o recoverability of on assessment: Willers v Gubay (2DS 2012/34) (06.03.13) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at § 52, citing Deemster Kerruish in Osiris Trustees Ltd & others v Oakley) (CA 2000/4) (10.05.05)); MRP International Ltd v MacIver (P/AST/2020/006) (15.04.21) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 19: “(i) counsel’s fees will be allowed if there is no duplication of work already done by the advocate; and (ii) counsel’s hourly charging rate is not greater than that charged by the advocate”); see also Jones v Montpelier Tax Planning (Isle of Man) Ltd (TXA 2009/1) (24.09.10) (§§ 29-31)

o discretion on costs: s 53(1) High Court Act 1991; Rule 11.3

o circumstances to have regard to, when deciding what order (if any) to make as to costs: Rule 11.3(5)

o conduct: relevant factor for court to take into account: Rule 11.3(5)(a) and Rule 11.3(6); Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/11) (18.04.18) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 51-56); exaggeration of claim (Rule 11.3(6)(d)): Shepherd v Wells (ORD 2017/48) (20.05.20) (Deemster Needham at § 14)

o unreasonable failure to comply with ADR order or engage in ADR: Rule 11.3(6)(e) (added by Rules of the High Court of Justice (Amendment) 2025); Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/11) (18.04.18) (§ 65)

o factors required to be taken into account when deciding the amount of costs: Rule 11.5

o general rule: unsuccessful party ordered to pay costs of successful party: Rule 11.3(2)(a); first task to determine who is the unsuccessful party: Gubay v Willers, above (§ 27); court can “make a different order”: Rule 11.3(2)(b)

“pay-as-you-go” philosophy, below

o instructing solicitor’s fees (see also “counsel’s fees”, above)

o recoverability of, on assessment: Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 21/0028) (29.11.22) (unrep.) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 15: “The guidance… in Osiris relates to counsel. This case… highlights circumstances where a higher solicitor’s rate may be allowed. Mr Novak is the instructing solicitor. He is co-ordinating actions in several jurisdictions brought to enforce the LCIA award and to protect the Spanish property. He has prepared and given all of the evidence for FS. It is necessary… for someone to have a global overview of the case and to be cognisant not only of the proceedings in the various jurisdictions but also of related proceedings which inform the actions needed in this case. Mr. Novak is that person. I do not consider the guidance in Osiris to limit the fees of an instructing solicitor in these circumstances”) (upheld on appeal: (2DS 2022/39-41, 43) (04.04.23); contrast MRP Brazil Ltd & another v Gort Holdings Ltd (CHP 15/0074) (15.01.26) (§§ 18 & 20) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 18: “I cannot see that the involvement of English solicitors in this [discrete] application, which involved an interrogation of the court’s own orders and had virtually no overlap with England, can justify the solicitors’ fees, not least when I see that they make up over half of the claimed costs. 20… This case is far different from Sodzawiczny. I disallow all the costs claimed by the solicitors”)

interest

o interim injunction: costs normally reserved until determination of the substantive issue but if special factors are present, a costs order may be made and those costs summarily assessed: McNally & others v Sodzawiczny (2DS 2022/39-41, 43) (04.04.23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Morris at § 28, applying Wingfield, Digby and Melford [2021] 1 WLR 1553) (however, note Isabel Dos Santos v Unitel S.A. [2024] EWCA Civ 1109 (30.09.24) (§§ 116-120)) (to the effect that there is no general rule that costs of a freezing injunction application should be reserved); exception to “pay-as-you-go” philosophy: Tobin v Dohle (IOM) Ltd & others (CHP 2020/124) (11.02.21) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 1-3)

o issue-based costs order: Nectrus Ltd v Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings (2DS 2019/30) (22.09.20) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Deemster Corlett at § 24: “The court must ask itself: (1) who, if anyone, is the successful party (Rule 11.3(2)(a))? (2) has the successful party lost on a discrete issue so as to deprive that party of the costs of that issue (Rules 11.3(5)(a)(b), (6)(a) – (c) and (7)(a))?”)

split costs order

mediation

o misconduct (conduct which appears “unreasonable or improper”: Rule 11.14(2)(b)), court’s powers in relation to: Rule 11.14; relevant factors: Ballacorey Wheat Ltd v Barclays Bank plc (2DS 2020/23) (04.12.20) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Le Cocq at §§ 50-57)

o guidance to practitioners: Deemster Corlett & Acting Deemster Gough, Managing Excessive Material in Commercial Litigation, Seminar Notes (Seminar, 04.11.25) (“Going forward, where there is a default regarding time limits the court will be more ready to hold the party to the limit set. Where the court considers it has been overburdened with unnecessary and lengthy material, unnecessary arguments and documents then, even if the party in default wins the case and would ordinarily be entitled to costs those costs are likely to be disallowed or dramatically reduced and appropriate direction given to the Costs Officer. The courts are likely to be more ready to impose heavy restrictions on costs recovery (Rule 11.14)”)

o commentary, Coren Law, Deemsters’ Warning on Excessive Written Material (12.25)

wasted costs

o non-party (costs in favour of, or against)

o jurisdiction: s 53 High Court Act 1991

o non-party to be added as party for purposes of costs and given opportunity to attend hearing: Rule 11.41(1)

o principles for ordering costs against: Clucas, above (15.12.05) (§§ 21 & 25); FSA v Montpelier (Trust and Corporate) Services Ltd (in liquidation) (CHP 20/0005) (15.06.23) (Acting Deemster Khamisa KC at §§ 113-116)

 o commentary, M&P Legal, Non-parties – costs orders and indemnity pitfalls (16.06.23); New Square Chambers,  Judgment was handed down from the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man in IOM FSA v Montpelier (Trust & Corporate) Services (26.06.23)

Norwich Pharmacal order (NPO)

offer to settle

o “pay-as-you-go” philosophy, underlines the RHCJ: Irving & another v Carter & another (ORD 2013/19) (07.12.17) (§§ 18 & 35 [2])

interim injunction, above

o payment on account / interim costs payment

o guidance: Bellamy v Forster (2DS 2017/28) (15.06.18) (§§ 22-23) (§ 23) (“… should not exceed the minimum amount recoverable on a detailed assessment, less the costs of such assessment proceedings… the relevant test is the “almost certainly collect” test…”); McNally & others v Sodzawiczny (2DS 2022/39-41, 43) (04.04.23) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC & Acting Deemster Morris at §§ 37-38); EMEA Oil Ltd v Petrodel Resources Ltd (SUM 2009/59) (27.10.10) (§§ 12-13)

o jurisdiction: Rule 11.3(9) (different test in England & Wales: see Hermitage One Ltd v Heda Airlines Ltd (ORD 2020/0001) (30.06.21) (§ 5))

o quantum examples: Gort (Holdings) Ltd v MRP Brazil (CHP 2014/97) (18.06.15) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 22) (standard assessment – 60%); McNally & others v Sodzawiczny, above (§ 38) (standard assessment – 70%);

o split costs order, court can order that a party pays (note – examples not-exhaustive): a proportion of another party’s costs (Rule 11.3(7)(a)); costs from or until a certain date only (Rule 11.3(7)(c)); costs incurred before proceedings have begun (Rule 11.3(7)(d))

o submissions on costs: Devereau v Gorman (ORD 23/0008) (05.06.25) (Deemster Corlett at § 1: “Counsel should always be prepared to address the court on costs on the delivery of judgment”)

o summary assessment

o “broad-brush approach”: Al-Zubaidi v Alzubeydi & others (2DS 2024/23) (06.08.25) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 7: “… such assessment must obviously make use of a ‘broad brush approach…”)

o Form HC45 (Statement of Costs) (click “Download file”)

o general rule: Rule 11.8(2) (“(a) at the conclusion of the trial of a claim allocated to the summary procedure, in which case the order shall deal with the costs of the whole claim, and (b) at the conclusion of any other hearing which has lasted not more than one day, in which case the order shall deal with the costs of the application or matter to which the hearing related; unless there is good reason not to do so…”)

o heads of costs: para 5, Schedule 11.1

o jurisdiction: Rule 11.8 & Schedule 11.1

o statement of costs, requirement to prepare, in the form of a schedule: para 2(1), Schedule 11.1

o time limit for filing and serving statement of costs: “as soon as possible and in any event not less than 24 hours before the date fixed for the hearing”: para 2(2), Schedule 11.1

o variation of costs order, no jurisdiction to order: Sochin v Baranov & another (CHP 2018/24) (09.10.19) (§§ 20-30) (Deemster Corlett citing at § 25 Andrew Smith J in Dar Al Arkan Real Estate v Al Refai [2015] EWHC 1793 (Comm))

without prejudice (WP)

· detailed assessment proceedings

o costs of, liability for: Rule 11.36

o costs officer, appeal from decision of, to judge: Rule 11.39(1)

o re-hearing on appeal: Rule 11.39(5)

o no further appeal save on a point of law: Rule 11.39(6)

o considered in: Willers v Gubay (2DS 2012/34) (06.03.13)

o default costs certificate

default costs certificate

o Form HC43 (Notice of Commencement of Assessment)

o form and contents of bill of costs: Schedule 11.2

o general rule: costs not to be assessed via detailed procedure until conclusion of the proceedings: Rule 11.22(1)

o offer marked “without prejudice save as to costs of detailed assessment proceedings” admissible: Rule 11.37

o points of dispute, requirement to file and serve within 21 days of service of the notice of commencement of detailed costs proceedings: Rule 11.28(1)

o steps where more than half of charges on detailed assessment disallowed: Rule 11.38

o start of: started by the receiving party filing and serving on the paying party a notice of the proceedings and a copy of the bill of costs: Rule 11.25(1)

· fixed costs

o amount of fixed costs for starting claim (Table 1): Rule 11.17

o jurisdiction: Rule 11.16 (note, Rules contains a typo here)

· Small Claims Procedure, costs in

o principles in: Bellamy & another v AC Electrical Ltd (SCP 2015/135) (07.07.20) (§§ 37-41)

o commentary, DQ, Costs in the Small Claims Court – what is recoverable? (12.08.20)

· special cases

Aarhus costs protection

o Crown, costs against the: Harding v Wood (ORD 2015/44) (18.12.15) (§§ 1-16)

o family / probate proceedings: general rule under Rule 11.3(2)(a) not applicable: Rule 11.3(3); K v K (FAM 2018/136) (28.02.23) (§§ 2-8) (Deemster Needham at § 2: “In family proceedings the general rule of costs following the event does not apply. Instead, rule 11.3(5) requires me to have regard to all the circumstances of the case including the litigation conduct of the parties and whether the party applying for costs has succeeded on part of their case. The normal position in cases involving private law family applications made under [s] 11 of the Children and Young Persons Act 2001 is that costs orders are not usually made”); X v Y (FAM 2016/32) (04.03.22) (application for financial provision) (Deemster Needham at § 26:  “… unlike in England the significance of “without prejudice” offers still applies in the Isle of Man by virtue of rule 11.3(5)(c)…”); C v C (FAM2023/194) (16.12.25) (Deemster Needham at §§ 8-10)

Legal Aid; litigant in person

o protective costs order: no reported local decision dealing directly with, but Corner House Research (2005) EWCA Civ 19 cited with approval in Tilleard & another v Allinson & others (CP 2008/1) (10.01.08) (§ 41)

o costs of proceedings involving trustee / personal representative: Driscoll v Evans (CHP 24/0005) (09.12.24) (Deemster Needham at §§ 4-15); Westwinds Grantees Ltd v Righi & others (CHP 24/0057) (07.08.25) (Deemster Needham at §§ 4-5)

o wasted costs

o definition: Rule 11.1(1)

o jurisdiction: Rule 11.47

o “uphill struggle to obtain”: Pearson & Pearson v Treasury (ORD 2009/25) (06.01.11) (§ 21) (Deemster Corlett, citing Patel v Air India [2010] EWCA Civ 443) (see § 15: “… not only must the claim be hopeless but there must be a breach of duty to the court, that being a breach by the solicitors of their duty to the court… or, as it has been put in other authorities such as Persaud v Persaud [2003] EWCA Civ 394, there must be something akin to an abuse of the process of the court”)

o warning from court: Deemster Corlett & Acting Deemster Gough, Managing Excessive Material in Commercial Litigation, Seminar Notes (Seminar, 04.11.25) “The court also has wasted cost orders (Rule 11.47) in its armoury. These have not been applied generally in the past, but litigants may expect them to be more in evidence going forward”)

o commentary, Coren Law, Deemsters’ Warning on Excessive Written Material (12.25)

costs

additional claim

· counterclaim is an additional claim: Philamere Ltd v Buck Confidential Ltd & another (SUM 2016/55) (31.10.16) (High Bailiff Needham at § 20)

· defendant’s counterclaim against claimant: Rule 6.48

· defendant’s counterclaim against person other than claimant: Rule 6.49

· discretion to allow a counterclaim to be filed under Rule 6.48(2)(b) (ie. with the court’s permission, when not filed with the defence), principles on: The Slegaby Estate Ltd v Lloyds Bank International Ltd (ORD 2014/27) (16.03.15) (§ 72) (High Bailiff Needham citing cases including Rahman v Sterling Credit Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 496): (“1) the discretion… exists at any time up to the time that full satisfaction of the judgment has been obtained; (2) delay… needs to be considered by the court as a relevant factor… Delay alone should not usually be a reason for not giving permission… (3) permission… should be refused… where the counterclaim had no reasonable prospect of success”)

access to court / justice

· audio recordings to be made of all substantive hearings: s 27(4) High Court Act 1991; Rule 9.8

· communications with the: (as from 23.02.26) Rule 2.63 (introduced by the Rules of the High Court of Justice (Amendment) 2026) (“(1) Any communication between a party to proceedings and the court must be disclosed to, and if in writing (whether in paper or electronic format), copied to, the other party or parties or their representatives”)

o applies to any representation to the court “on a matter of substance or procedure” but does not to “purely routine, uncontentious and administrative” communications: Rule 2.63(2)

o party not required to disclose or copy a communication if there is “a compelling reason for not doing so, and provided that any reason is clearly stated”: Rule 2.63(3)

o a written communication required to be copied to the other party or parties or their representatives must state on its face that it is being copied to that person or those persons, stating their identity and capacity: Rule 2.63(4)

o unless the court directs otherwise, a written communication which does not comply with Rule 2.63(4) will be returned to the sender without being considered by the court: Rule 2.63(5)

o where a party fails to comply with Rule 2.63(1) the court may, subject to hearing the parties, impose sanctions or exercise its other case management powers under Part 7: Rule 2.63(6)

o Rule 2.63(1) does not apply to communications authorised by a rule or practice direction to be sent to the court without at the same time being provided to the other party or parties or their representatives: Rule 2.63(7))

o as to the prior common law position see Zuma’s Choice Pet Products Ltd & another v Azumi Ltd & others [2017] EWCA Civ 2133 (at § 8) “… as all practitioners know, it is improper for a litigant to attempt to correspond with the court on a “private and confidential” basis. Communications having any relevance to a case being conducted inter partes need to be sent to the other side no later than the time when they are sent to the judge. Unless there are special reasons to do so… the court does not take any step adverse to a party without allowing that party the opportunity to be heard. If it is possible to do so, a judge who receives such a communication should return it unread, explaining shortly to the litigant the impropriety of sending unilateral correspondence”)

o commentary, Coren Law, Communications with the Court – New Rule 2.63 (16.02.26)

· contact us

Court clerks

· court dress

o commentary, Callin Wild, To Wig, or not to Wig, that is the question (26.07.23)

court officer; fees

· funds in: s 31 High Court Act 1991

· general powers of management of: Rule 7.2(2)

active case management; alternative dispute resolution (ADR); evidence; extension of time; issue, exclusion of; preliminary issue; split trial; stay; telephone; video link

o Rule 7.2(2)(n) (“take any other step or make any other order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective…”)

o see Bitel LLC v Kyrgyz Mobil et al (ORD 2011/48) (26.06.12) (§ 46)

· history of the Courts (courts.im)

officer of the court; payment into / out of Court

· primary duty of: Montpelier Tax Planning (Isle of Man) Ltd (In liquidation) v Gittins & others (2DS 2012/45) (08.06.15) (§ 143) (“to achieve justice as between the parties…. in Texan Management [Ltd] & Others v Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Company [Ltd] [2009] UKPC 46 Lord Collins observed… : `It has often been said that, in the pursuit of justice, procedure is a servant not a master'”)

judiciary

· report of proceeding in: “A fair and accurate report of proceedings in public before a court to which this section applies, if published contemporaneously with proceedings, is absolutely privileged”: s 19(1) Law Reform Act 1997

· structure: courts.im, Court Structure

· contact details

court (see court dress)

Court records, access to

· Rule 2.21(1) & Rule 2.21(3) (NB: no exact equivalent of CPR Rule 5.4(C)

English (and other) precedent

· definition of: Rule 1.4 (“the division of the General Registry dealing with the business of the court”)

limitation

· officer: Rule 2.3(1) (“Where these Rules require or permit the court to perform an act of a formal or administrative character, that act may be performed by a court officer”)

advocate

Court file, sealing the

· Rule 2.21

advocate, duties of

order

· Gubay v Willers (2DS 2014/19) (21.11.14) (Judge of Appeal Tattersall QC & Deemster Doyle at § 53) (citing Burton J in Tullow Uganda Ltd v Heritage Oil and Gas Ltd [2013] EWHC 1656 (Comm) at § 62: “…  if there is to be such an onslaught on the honesty and credibility of these two professional witnesses… it must be necessary and in any event sensible and fair to put to that witness that in certain… respects he has been dishonest and is not telling the truth. This is not simply out of fairness to the witness, but it is also necessary for the judge, because if I am to conclude that an otherwise apparently honest and respected professional has been deliberately false and misleading, I must have the opportunity to see how the witnesses respond to each such suggestion and see whether I am persuaded by their answer (if any)”)

cross-examination; findings of fact; hearsay evidence; witness

· disclosure as to, generally impermissible: see Bellamy v Hughes & another (ORD 26/0001) (28.08.26) (Deemster Corlett at § 12) (citing his own judgment in Gubay v Willers (No. 2) 2011 MLR N-6)

findings of fact

· maxim ‘falsus in uno; falsus in omnibus’: Buksh v Bush & others (ORD 21/0010) (29.05.24) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 272) (“There is a legal maxim “falsus in uno; falsus in omnibus” which broadly means that if a person lies in one thing it may be assumed he lies in other things as well”)

set-off of cross execution orders

exclusive jurisdiction clause; forum non conveniens; reciprocal enforcement of overseas judgments; service out of the jurisdiction; universalism

· allowance for certain witnesses: Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/0011) (15.09.14) (at § 18: “… the court should make allowance for the frail and elderly, for example, and also children and young people who have to give evidence in… civil cases, and those lingering under a disability which might render them less eloquent or able than some others”)

expert evidence

· illness of witness, application to be excused due to: Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/11) (23.12.15) (at § 43: “I refer… to what I described as the inalienable right of a litigant to be able to cross examine his opponent to which I referred at paragraph 53 of my judgment of 15th September 2014. But in my view that right may be displaced or overridden if the process of cross-examination will, firstly, not be helpful to the court because of the disability or illness of the litigant and/or secondly, is likely to lead to a deterioration in the health of the witness such as to expose him or her to the risk of an infection which will probably prove fatal, or the cross-examination is likely to undermine their health so as to hasten their death…”)

o standard of medical evidence required: Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/11) (23.12.15) (Deemster Corlett at § 27, citing a passage in Levi v Ellis-Carr [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch): “… it falls far short of the medical evidence required to demonstrate that the party is unable to attend a hearing and participate in the trial. Such evidence should identify the medical attendant and give details of his familiarity with the party’s medical condition (detailing all recent consultations), should identify with particularity what the patient’s medical condition is and the features of that condition which (in the medical attendant’s opinion) prevent participation in the trial process, should provide a reasoned prognosis and should give the court some confidence that what is being expressed is an independent opinion after a proper examination. It is being tendered as expert evidence. The court can then consider what weight to attach to that opinion, and what arrangements might be made (short of an adjournment) to accommodate a party‘s difficulties. No judge is bound to accept expert evidence: even a proper medical report falls to be considered simply as part of the material as a whole (including the previous conduct of the case)”)

· limit, court may: Rule 8.1(3)

· order for:

o guidance: Illumination International LLC v VHGL & others (ORD 23/0034) (15.05.24) (§§ 9-10) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 10 citing Slade LJ in House of Spring Gardens Ltd & others v Waite & others (Mareva Practice) [1985] FSR 173)

o jurisdiction: Rule 8.7

· right of litigants to cross-examine opponents to test their evidence: Gubay v Willers, above (§ 53: “Mr Wannenburgh rightly points to the inalienable right of litigants to cross-examine their opponents in order to test their evidence. It is indeed a cornerstone and central right in our civil justice system to be able to do so. One should only be deprived of that right for very good reason. This is particularly the case in a matter such as this, where the resolution of the case depends upon a conflict of oral testimony and recollection. Credibility is a central issue…”)

· smart technology, use of in Court by witness: see UAB Business Enterprise & another v Oneta Ltd & others [2026] EWHC 543 (Ch) (11.03.26) (§§ 117-120 & 128) (use of smart glasses whilst giving evidence)

witness

undertaking / cross-undertaking in damages

· consideration of: Harding v Wood (ORD 2015/44) (30.10.15) (§§ 42-54) (at § 51 (b): “Whether or not state immunity is a denial of a substantive right or the imposition of a procedural bar, in my judgment sovereign immunity is better characterised as the former”)

public interest immunity (PII)

· commentary, Coren Law, Cryptocurrency fraud, civil law and the Isle of Man (30.08.26) 

injunction

Manx customary law and breast law, development of

aggravated damages; damages for gratuitous care; defamation; doleance; exemplary damages; general damages; Human Rights Act 2001 (HRA); inquiry as to damages; interest; interim injunction; periodical payments of damages; personal injury claim; provisional damages (for personal injuries); special damages; undertaking / cross-undertaking in damages;

· principles for assessment of: Shepherd v Wells (ORD 2017/48) (10.03.20) (Deemster Needham at §§ 10-13) (25% discount applied)

· Article 82(1) (“Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered”); see also Recital 146

GDPR and LED Implementing Regulations 2018

limitation

appeal (see additional evidence on appeal)

Coroner of inquests; limitation; party / parties

· guidance: Gittins & another v Montpelier (Trust and Corporate) Services Ltd (In Liquidation) (2DS 2020/11) (04.09.24) (§§ 53-58) (Judge of Appeal Cross KC at § 53 citing Sir Richard Field (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court of England and Wales) in Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Sinclair & others [2017] EWHC 2424; [2017] 5 Costs LR 877); Clypse Farms Ltd (in receivership) & another v RBSI t/as Isle of Man Bank (2DS 2023/22) (13.11.23) (§ 25); Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 21/0028) (08.03.24) (unrep.) (§§ 9-11) (Acting Deemster Gough at § 9: “The court has jurisdiction to make an unless order if a party fails to comply with a court order or to pay costs orders (Rule 7.2(3)(b) and Gama Aviation Ltd and anor v MWWMMWM Limited [2021] EWHC 2229 (Comm)). Mr Coren also relies on Rule 2.58 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process”); see Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 21/0028) (17.09.24) (unrep.) (§ 22) (“… [Mr Sodzawiczny]… has succeeded in applications where I have ordered costs in his favour…. he is having the devil’s own job to collect those costs with most of the Defendants being abroad and frankly just ignoring the court’s orders. [He] is entitled to enforce these orders and to deploy the legal remedies available to him to do so. So egregious has been the behaviour of some… Defendants that I have made an order excluding certain parties from further engaging in this proceeding until they comply…”)

o commentary, Coren Law, Debarring Orders in the Isle of Man – Practice & Procedure (05.07.26)

unless order

· commentary, Coren Law, Appeal Division on deceit, unlawful distribution, breach of fiduciary duty & limitation (07.06.26)

interim declaration; particulars of claim

· power to make declarations (only): Rule 10.21

· principles: Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Overseas Limited (CHP 2013/66) (12.11.19) (Acting Deemster Kainth at §§ 16-20); see also Montpelier (Trust and Corporate) Services Ltd v Gittins & another (ORD 19/0050 (formerly CHP 19/0137)) (10.03.22) (Acting Deemster Khamisa QC at §§ 4-6)

bankruptcy

· consideration of s 11 The Bankruptcy Code 1892, s 17 Bankruptcy Procedure Act 1892 and s 2 Imprisonment for Debt Act 1928: Alder v Lloyds Bank International Ltd (2DS 2018/10) (18.01.19) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Acting Deemster Christie QC at §§ 9, 55-58, 60-63, 84-98)

human rights; Human Rights Act 2001

· jurisdiction: s 4(2) Human Rights Act 2001

· prior notice required to be given to Attorney General: Rule 3.9(1)

business day

· document served after 5pm on a business day, or on Christmas Day, Good Friday, a Saturday, Sunday or Bank Holiday, treated as being served on the next business day: Rule 2.29(1)

Code of Conduct for Members of the Judiciary of the Isle of Man

Deemsters, former

· First Deemster, president of the High Court: s 3(2) High Court Act 1991

· First / Second Deemster

o office, each holds at pleasure of [His] Majesty: s 3A(2) High Court Act 1991

· may sit in any division of the High Court (subject to s 2(3)): s 2(2)(a) High Court Act 1991

judiciary; Deemster’s oath

· First Deemster Andrew Corlett

o Swearing-In as Second Deemster (01.04.11)

o Deemster Corlett’s speech at his swearing in as First Deemster and Clerk of the Rolls (19.09.18)

· Second Deemster John Needham

o Appointment of Second Deemster (29.11.18)

· Deemster William Cain QC, CBE, TH (1935-2021)

o Address of Deemster Corlett to pay tribute (21.05.21)

Manx customary law and breast law, development of

o The Marlburian Club, Obituary

· Deemster Henry Callow CBE (1926-2006)

o Manx Heritage Foundation Oral History Project, Interview (2000) (“… you must apply the law, you also try and apply a little bit of humanity…”) (p. 15)

· Deemster Jack Corrin, CBE, TH (1932-2019)

o His Honour JW Corrin (11.04.19)

· Deemster David Doyle, CBE

o Case-law on the Rules of the High Court of Justice 2009 (28.03.22)

o Valedictory ceremony for Deemster Doyle (27.07.18)

· Deemster John Michael (“Mike”) Kerruish QC (1948-2010)

o Deemster Kerruish Endeavour Award

o Eulogy delivered by Deemster David Doyle (19.07.10)

· Deputy Deemster Andrew Williamson (1946-2022)

o Tribute to His Honour Andrew Williamson (13.07.22)

Judges of Appeal, former

· apology, defendant can plead in his defence: “that he has made or offered an apology to the [claimant] for such defamation before the commencement of the action, or as soon afterwards as he had an opportunity of doing so, in case the action shall have been commenced before there was an opportunity of making or offering such apology”: s 4 The Libel and Slander Act 1892

· commentary, Prof. Tim Crook, UK Media Law Pocketbook (pp. 336-340)

court; limitation (see Table 8)

· damages, example of award of: Stanley v Morris (SCP 2012/1551) (24.09.13) (§ 99) (£10,000)

· defences (not exhaustive)

o defence of fair comment, in respect of words consisting partly of allegations of fact and partly of expression of opinion: s 6 Defamation Act 1954

o defence of justification, in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges: s 5 Defamation Act 1954

o defence of reasonable care in relation to publication: s 8(1)(b) Law Reform Act 1997 (see also s 8(5) Law Reform Act 1997)

· Jameel abuse: Willers v Nugent & another (SUM 2013/145) (24.03.16) (Deemster Corlett at § 66: “… a unique jurisdiction to strike out as an abuse of process those proceedings that do not serve the legitimate purpose of protecting the claimant’s reputation, such that the costs of proceedings will be out of all proportion to the damages and vindication which can be achieved. The test for a strike-out on this basis is whether there has been a ‘real and substantial tort'”) (see also Nugent & another v Willers [2019] UKPC1, Lord Kitchin at § 11)

jury

· offer to make amends

o jurisdiction: s 9 Law Reform Act 1997

o procedure on accepting offer to make amends: s 10 Law Reform Act 1997

qualified privilege

· restraining order: s 15(1)(d) Law Reform Act 1997 (“an order restraining the defendant from publishing or further publishing the matter complained of”)

o perpetual restraining order granted: Stanley v Morris (SCP 2012/1551) (24.09.13) (§ 103)

· “slander in respect of words calculated to disparage the [claimant] in any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication”: not necessary to allege or prove special damage: s 2 Defamation Act 1954

· statement, meaning of: s 13 Law Reform Act 1997 (“the court shall not be asked to rule whether a statement is arguably capable, as opposed to capable, of bearing a particular meaning or meanings attributed to it”)

· summary disposal, under ss 14-15 Law Reform Act 1997; Rule 13.80

· Form HC43A (Request for Default Costs Certificate)

· jurisdiction to request: Rule 11.30(1)

· jurisdiction to set aside: Rule 11.31: court “must set aside… if the receiving party was not entitled to it” (Rule 11.31(1)); “In any other case, the court may set aside or vary… if it appears to the court that there is some good reason why the detailed assessment proceedings should continue”: Rule 11.31(2)

o guidance: Scott v Walshaw & others (CHP 2010/144) (16.06.14) (Deemster Doyle at §§ 32-34); MRP International Ltd v MacIver (P/AST/2020/006) (15.04.21) (Acting Deemster Gough at §§ 6-7); Glen Moar Properties Ltd (in BVI liquidation) & others v McNally & another (ORD 20/025) (10.09.24) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 9-32)

default costs certificate

· set aside, relevant factors in application to: Scott v Walshaw & others (CHP 2010/144) (16.06.14) (§§ 32-34)

· additional claim, default judgment on: Rule 10.33

· conditions to be satisfied: Rule 10.24

· definition: Rule 10.22 (ie. where a defendant: “(a) has failed to file an acknowledgement of service; or (b) has failed to file a defence”)

· jurisdiction to obtain by application: Rule 10.25(2)

o circumstances when application, not request, required: Rule 10.25(2); Quirk & Quirk v Kelly (ORD 2012/72) (03.05.13) (Deemster Corlett at §§ 4-5)

· jurisdiction to obtain by request: Rule 10.25(1) (see also Rule 10.26(1))

· jurisdiction to set aside (discretionary): Rule 10.35

o commentary, Cains’ Judgment Journal (04.25)

o evidence: application must be supported by: Rule 10.35(3)

o guidance: Tower Credit Ltd v Dadds & another (SUM 2010/16) (30.01.17) (§§ 41-42) (High Bailiff Needham, citing Deemster Corlett in Cedar Developments v Thornhill (SUM 2015/107) (21.04.16)) (“41… the Defendant must show that his prospects of successfully defending the claim are “real” as opposed to “fanciful”. The Court should not conduct a mini-trial and most importantly the Defence relied on must be more than merely arguable. It must carry some degree of conviction… 42 At this stage it is not for me to make findings of fact but I can make… broad assessment in terms of merit…”) (note – test re-applied in VTV Consulting Ltd v Precision Health Corp PCC Ltd (ORD 23/0052) (19.06.24), § 3);

o  see Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets PLC v Wilmot & another (ORD 24/0042) (12.12.25) (Acting Deemster Wild at § 22: “The Applicant… cites… Denton v TH White Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 906 …, which has been followed in later Isle of Man cases; it is submitted that the applications fail to satisfy the Denton test too… however, I am not convinced that I need to look at another Rule or apply another test in order to exercise my discretion under Rule 10.35. The whole point of introducing the RHC was that the Rules were far more specific than the old Isle of Man Rules of Court and that, in most cases, applications could be considered by analysing the clear meaning of the words in the rules rather than delving into caselaw relating to other rules. I do not consider that the Denton test adds anything to my analysis, albeit I confirm that, if I applied a relief from sanction type test, I would also have dismissed the Set Aside Application…”)

o promptness, court must have regard to matters including: “whether the person seeking to set aside the judgment made an application to do so promptly”: Rule 10.35(2)

o burden for proving promptness: “45. The Defendants also have the burden of persuading me that they acted promptly when they learned of the existence of the default judgments in seeking to set them aside” (Tower Credit Ltd v Dadds & another, above (High Bailiff Needham at § 45))

o Table 5: Outcomes on application of “promptly” test to set aside a default judgment, comparison of:

o test for “promptly”, defendant must act: “with all reasonable celerity in the circumstances” (Tower Credit Ltd v Dadds & another, above (§ 46) (High Bailiff Needham applying Simon Browne LJ in Regency Rolls v Murat Carnall [2000] EWCA Civ 379, where a delay of 30 days was held: “altogether too long a delay…”); see VTV Consulting Ltd v Precision Health Corp PCC Ltd (ORD 23/0052) (19.06.24) (Deemster Needham at § 4: “promptness depends on the circumstances”)

o relief from sanctions checklist also applies: “… the court will first consider the two specific matters mentioned in [Rule 10.35(1)-(2)] (namely the merits of the case and the delay in making the application to set aside) before applying the three-stage test which applies to applications for relief from sanctions in its full rigour”) (Court of Appeal in England & Wales, Practice Note in FXF v English Karate Federation Ltd & another [2023] EWCA Civ 891, as applied in VTV Consulting Ltd v Precision Health Corp PCC Ltd, above) (Deemster Needham at § 6)

· jurisdiction to set aside (mandatory): Rule 10.34

o Tower Credit Ltd v Dadds & another, above (High Bailiff Needham at § 30)

· State, default judgment against, when takes effect: Rule 10.11

acknowledgment of service

· consequence of not filing: Rule 6.25

default judgment

· content of: Rule 6.31(1) (“In his defence, the defendant must state — (a) which of the allegations in the particulars of claim he denies; (b) which allegations he is unable to admit or deny, but which he requires the claimant to prove; and which allegations he admits”)

· extend period for filing, agreement to: Rule 6.27(1) (“The defendant and the claimant may agree that the period for filing a defence specified in rule 6.26 shall be extended by up to 28 days”)

· limitation period relied on, must give details of expiry of: Rule 6.34

· requirement to file and serve on all parties: Rule 6.24

particulars of claim; personal injury claim

· Rules 6.24-6.34

· set-off, defence of: Rule 6.32

statement of case

· statement of value: if disputed, must state why and, if able, give own statement of value: Rule 6.36(6)

· time limit for filing (subject to Rule 6.26(2)): “(a) 14 days after service of the particulars of claim; or (b) if the defendant files an acknowledgment of service… 28 days after service of the particulars of claim”: Rule 6.26(1)

acknowledgment of service; action of arrest; admission; Chancery Procedure; claim form; counterclaim; default judgment; discontinuance; jurisdiction; particulars of claim

abuse of process

· undue or improper delay not to be encouraged: Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Ltd (CHP 2013/66) (13.12.13) (§§ 97-98) (Deemster Doyle at § 97: “A party unnecessarily and repeatedly insisting on the observance of his strict legal procedural rights for no real tangible benefit other than tactical delay can create an injustice and an abuse. Courts must remain on guard in respect of potential injustices and abuses… Attempts by parties to unduly and improperly delay matters for no benefit under the pretence of observance of their strict legal procedural rights should not be encouraged…”)

relief from sanctions

· jurisdiction: s 175 Companies Act 2006 (in respect of 2006 Act company shareholders)

o guidance: Gulf Hibiscus Ltd & another v Lime Petroleum PLC (in liquidation) (2DS 2017/20) (07.12.17) (Judge of Appeal Storey QC & Deemster Corlett at § 15)

o commentary, Coren Law, Manhattan Coffee: JCPC clarifies who may bring derivative claim on behalf of company in liquidation (24.05.26)

· procedure “where a company, other incorporated body or trade union is alleged to be entitled to claim a remedy and a claim is made by one or more members of the company, body or trade union for it to be given that remedy (“a derivative claim”): Rule 3.31

costs

Article 5 ECHR

· discretion to make an order to produce on a without notice application under Rule 13.74: Rule 13.75(1)(a)