Setting aside judgments on admission – Isle of Man High Court offers guidance in ‘wrongful life’ claim

Tests to set aside judgments on admission and to withdraw admissions 

In October 2021, the Claimant mother in a high-value ‘wrongful life’ clinical negligence/breach of duty claim, and the DHSC, had agreed a consent order. Causation and liability were, by consent, admitted by the DHSC, with quantum remaining to be determined. By application in September 2025, after obtaining a fresh expert report, the DHSC applied to vary that consent order. This was to clarify the nature of its earlier admission on liability and to withdraw completely its earlier admission on causation. The Claimant resisted this application. The child had also been substituted as Claimant for the mother, by earlier consent order in August 2021: the mother now also sought to revoke that substitution.

Dismissing the DHSC’s variation application, and revoking the earlier consent order substituting the child for the mother, Deemster Needham recently considered the relevant tests, in R v DHSC (ORD 20/0008) (30.01.26). Like Acting Deemster Caine in Old Mutual International Isle of Man Ltd v Caddick 2017 MLR 360, he considered that, logically, the issue as to setting aside the judgment should be determined before the issue of permission to withdraw the admission.

Setting aside a judgment on admission

Under Rule 7.2(7), the power to make an order includes the power to vary or revoke it. Deemster Needham cited the following summary of Acting Deemster Caine from Old Mutual International Isle of Man Ltd v Caddick 2017 MLR 360 (at § 57):

“(i) an application under Rule 7.2(7) to set aside a judgment upon admission which is determinative of the case cannot be founded upon the grounds of erroneous information or subsequent event (per Hughes LJ in Roult) (above);

(ii) even if I am wrong in this regard, and an application under Rule 7.2(7) to set aside a final judgment upon admission can be founded upon erroneous information before the court, a conscious choice not to deploy relevant material (whether evidence or argument) will present an almost insuperable barrier to the application (per Briggs J in Kojima);

(iii) the principles upon which final judgments may be set aside are limited in number, of long standing, and are well founded upon a clearly articulated public policy. For a new procedural rule to displace or extend those principles, a truly exceptional case would be required (per Norris J in QBE);

(iv) it may be possible to set aside a final judgment obtained by fraud… (per Matthews J in Prompt Motors);

(v) it makes no difference that the final order which disposes of an action is made without an adjudication by a judge of the merits. A final order is a final order, whether it results from an admission, a default by the defendant, consent of the defendant, proof before a judge at a trial where the defendant does not appear, or an adjudication on the merits after a fully contested trial (per Norris J in QBE);

(vi) the interest of justice, and of litigants generally, require that a final order remains as such unless proper grounds for appeal exist (per Hughes LJ in Roult).”

Deemster Needham also referred to dicta of Hamblen LJ in Terry v BCS Corporate Acceptances Ltd & others [2018] EWCA Civ 2422 (“the circumstances in which CPR 3.1(7) can be relied upon to vary or revoke an interim order are limited. Normally, it will require a material change of circumstances since the order was made, or the facts on which the original decision was made being misstated”); and Lewison LJ in Vodafone Group Plc & Ors v IPCom GmbH & Co KG [2023] EWCA Civ 113 (10.02.23) (“… the court’s power… to vary or revoke orders either cannot or should not be used to discharge a sealed final order. The only limited exception thus far even contemplated in civil proceedings is the case of a continuing order (such as a final injunction).”) He also considered Simmons v City Hospitals Sunderland NHS (2016) [2016] EWHC 2953 (QB), a case with some factual similarities, where a partial admission had been set aside.

Withdrawing an admission

Deemster Needham also considered an alternative basis for the Defendant’s application. Under Rule 6.19(5), the Court’s permission is required to amend or withdraw an admission. Deemster Needham considered the (albeit now deleted) CPR Part 14 Practice Direction and dicta of Ward LJ at § 26 of Woodland v Stopford [2011] EWCA Civ 26. There, the English Court of Appeal considered factors in the (now former) Part 14 PD. Deemster Needham noted (at § 36): “the lack of their being a hierarchy in application of such considerations and the fact-sensitive nature of the exercise in “striking a balance with a view to achieving the overriding objective””. Those (former) factors were:

“(a) the grounds upon which the applicant seeks to withdraw the admission including whether or not new evidence has come to light which was not available at the time the admission was made;

(b) the conduct of the parties, including any conduct which led the party making the admission to do so;

(c) the prejudice that may be caused to any person if the admission is withdrawn;

(d) the prejudice that may be caused to any person if the application is refused;

(e) the stage in the proceedings at which the application to withdraw is made, in particular in relation to the date or period fixed for trial;

(f) the prospects of success (if the admission is withdrawn) of the claim or part of the claim in relation to which the offer was made; and

(g) the interests of the administration of justice…”.

Conclusions

At § 56, Deemster Needham held that:

“… the use of the discretion under rule 7.2(7) of the 2009 Rules, where a final order has been made upon liability, is plainly one that must require the application of extreme caution before it is exercised by the court. The pursuit of a public policy regarding the merits of finality in litigation is such that setting aside final orders, carries a real danger of opening the door to a plethora of unwarranted applications seeking to resurrect litigation that, in colloquial terms, has been “done and dusted” long ago. Such would be wholly detrimental to the virtues of an expeditious, fair and cost-effective justice system. Aside from where there has been fraud or other such trickery, cases where the circumstances in which the courts (particularly at first instance) should be able to set aside final orders in the interests of justice will be few and far between”.

Simmons was distinguished on the facts: here, by contrast, there had been a complete admission of liability; the case had advanced well beyond the relatively early position reached in Simmons; and indeed interim damages had been paid. Further, with due diligence, the issue as to which additional evidence had been sought by the Defendant could have been pursued with the Court-approved experts in 2021; and, unlike Simmons, the Court had determined the extent of the expert evidence to be used. His Honour was therefore not minded to exercise his discretion to set aside the judgment on liability and causation in the consent order. This being the case, there was no need to consider the application to withdraw the relevant admissions. The mother was also ordered to replace the child as Claimant.

Note for practitioners: The message from the Isle of Man Court is that final orders following admissions must remain final, and that exceptions in the interests of justice will be “few and far between”.

Disclaimer: professional advice should be sought before applying any information in a given case.

For advice on Isle of Man civil procedure, or clinical negligence, contact Coren Law.

See also Coren Law’s Isle of Man civil procedure portal: Click On | Coren Law.

Photo: Neil Corlett