Isle of Man Civil Contempt – Practice & Procedure

An overview of practice and procedure on Isle of Man civil contempt

Isle of Man civil contempt law is far from fully aligned with English law. Civil contempt in the Isle of Man was considered in detail in the Sodzawiczny v McNally litigation (Coren Law, instructed by Charles Russell Speechlys LLP, acting for the successful Applicant). Advocate Steven Coren of Coren Law reviews current Isle of Man case-law, practice and procedure – with one eye on possible legislation on the horizon.

Criminal or civil contempt?

Section II(5) of the Criminal Law Act 1736 (as amended) provides that:

“… Courts of Justice… doing the Duty of their Offices shall have and continue the Power of comitting and fineing any Person or Persons for contemptuous Behaviour, insulting or abuseing them, or any of them, in the Execution of their Duty, according as the Nature of the Offence shall demeritt”.

This provision of antiquity was relied on, in the Court of General Gaol Delivery, by Deemster Cook in Kyle Reece Wright (CRIM 24/CC) (13.03.24) (at § 2).

As Lord Toulson stated in Director of the Serious Fraud Office v O’Brien [2014] UKSC 23 (§ 39): “A criminal contempt is conduct which goes beyond mere non-compliance with a court order or undertaking and involves a serious interference with the administration of justice”. 

Current differences between Isle of Man and English law on civil contempt

In January 2025, the English Courts and Tribunals Judiciary published a useful summary of the English position on contempt of court generally. In November 2025, the Law Commission published Contempt of Court: Report (Part 1) on Liability.

In the Isle of Man, in Re Barr and Anglo International Holdings Ltd 1990-92 MLR 398 (a criminal contempt case), the Staff of Government Division (Hytner JA and Deemster Callow) reviewed the Manx contempt landscape and held (at p. 410):

“… the law of contempt… in the Isle of Man still derived from common law alone – that is, in practice, such of the English common law of contempt as had been preserved by Parliament when it instituted statutory rules in England…”

In Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 2021/0028) (29.11.23) (unrep.) (a civil contempt case), Acting Deemster Gough held (at (§ 31):

“There are differences between the law of contempt in this jurisdiction and the law in England and Wales. The law in this jurisdiction derives from the common law, whereas the law of contempt in England and Wales is, in part, governed by statute. There is no real difference when it comes to the principles, although there is a significant difference when penalties are being considered.”

Civil contempt – key principles

In the same case, Acting Deemster Gough held (at § 29) that the following key principles applied in respect of non-compliance with an order endorsed with a penal notice:

“(1) non-compliance with a court order endorsed with a penal notice amounts to a civil contempt enforceable by committal;

(2) the contempt must be proved to the criminal standard;

(3) it must be proved that the contempt respondent (i) knew the terms of the injunction, (ii) acted or failed to act in a manner which involved a breach of the injunction and (iii) knew the facts which made that conduct a breach;

(4) there is a breach if an act intentionally done amounts to a breach of the injunction; and

(5) where a company is ordered not to do certain acts and a director of that company is aware of the order they are under a duty to take reasonable steps to make sure the order is obeyed. If they wilfully fail to take the required steps and the order is breached they can be punished for contempt.”

So what exactly is a “penal notice”? Rule 10.14(1) provides:

“An order which restrains a party from doing an act or requires an act to be done should, if disobedience is to be dealt with by an application to bring contempt of court proceedings, have a penal notice endorsed on it as follows: “If you the within-named [ ] do not comply with this order you may be held to be in contempt of court and imprisoned or fined, or [in the case of a company or corporation] your assets may be seized.”

Cases in which Rule 10.14 was construed strictly include: Tilleard v Carter (ORD 2010/0052) (30.04.12) (Deemster Doyle at § 23) and Gubay v Willers (ORD 2009/0011) (13.06.19) (Deemster Corlett at § 34).

Committal for contempt – procedural requirements

Committal for contempt is dealt with in Part 12, Chapter 9 of the Rules. A committal order in respect of contempt “committed in connection with… any proceedings before the court” can be dealt with only by a Deemster: Rule 12.61(2).

Affidavit  An application in existing proceedings (or claim form otherwise) has to be accompanied by an affidavit in support, setting out various prescribed details, including the grounds: Rule 12.62(2).

14 clear days There must be at least 14 clear days between service of an application notice (or claim form) and the hearing date: Rule 12.62(3).

Personal service Under Rule 12.62(4), unless the court otherwise directs, a copy of the application notice or claim form, accompanied by a copy of the affidavit in support of the application, “must be served personally on the person sought to be committed”.

False disclosure statement or statement of truth

Rule 8.70 provides:

“(1) Proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. Proceedings under this rule may be brought only —
(a) by the Attorney General; or
(b) with the permission of the court.”

Paragraph 24(1) of Schedule 8.1 provides:

“Where a party alleges that a statement of truth or a disclosure statement is false the party shall refer that allegation to the court, which may —
(a) exercise any of its powers under the rules;
(b) initiate steps to consider if there is a contempt of court and, where there is, to punish it;
(c) direct the party making the allegation to refer the matter to the Attorney General with a request to him to consider whether he wishes to bring proceedings for contempt of court.”

Sentencing for contempt

In Drower v Gubay (2DS 2005/1) (31.05.05), which concerned non-compliance with an order relating to an allegedly defamatory satirical website, the upheld sentence was a £2,500 fine, with 12 months to pay. This unusual litigation was notable for several reasons, including the novel grant of a search and seize order to support a libel claim.

In Templeton Insurance Ltd v Taylor (ORD 2019/0016) (11.09.19), breach of an asset disclosure order resulted in a sentence of 30 days’ custody, suspended for 12 months.

Deemster Corlett held:

“8. I… refer to… Reynolds v Long [2018] EWHC 3535 (Ch)… . In particular paragraph 56…:

“…The most serious penalty for contempt is committal to prison. Under section 14(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, a committal order must be for a fixed term, and may not on any one occasion exceed 2 years.”

9. I pause to comment there that the position as to maximum sentence in Manx Law is uncertain as we have no equivalent to that section but it is common ground between counsel that I should adopt that nominal maximum for the purposes of today’s exercise.

10. Continuing:

“Committal may serve two distinct purposes… First it is a punishment of past contempt and secondly it can secure compliance. It may be good practice, if the court’s sentence includes elements of both, to make clear what period of committal is regarded as appropriate for punishment alone, i.e. what period would be regarded as just if the contemnor were promptly to comply with the order in question… Committal may be suspended… This is a matter of discretion. Suspension may be appropriate as a first step, with a view to securing compliance with the court’s orders… or in view of cogent personal mitigation. The court may impose a fine… There is no statutory limit to the amount of a fine… If a fine is an appropriate punishment it is wrong to impose a custodial sentence because the contemnor could not pay the fine… As a general matter, the court should bear in mind the desirability of keeping offenders, in particular first-time offenders, out of prison… Imprisonment is the sentence of last resort and only appropriate where there is serious, contumacious flouting of orders of the court…

16. … while the dissipation of assets in deliberate breach of a freezing order is very serious indeed it may be argued that just as serious is the failure to disclose assets in the first place in compliance with the order. … this issue of contempt of court is not to do with the dignity of the court but everything to do with the public interest that court orders should be obeyed. It is therefore a central part of the rule of law. It might be said that this is particularly an important factor in jurisdictions such as the Isle of Man which are offshore financial centres, where there is a particular importance attached to the immediate freezing of assets in cases where assets can be moved very freely amongst the various jurisdictions.”

Sodzawiczny v McNally & others (ORD 2021/0028) (15.05.24) (unrep.) related to breach of an injunction concerning a Spanish property. Simon Jansen was sentenced to 30 days’ custody, suspended for 12 months (§ 13); Atik Miah and Nicholas Thomas were each fined £15,000 (with 3 months to pay) (§ 24). Acting Deemster Gough took into account sentencing guidelines referred to in HMAG v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 (at § 44).

Contempt of Court Bill 2025

A consultation, closing in October 2025, proposed a Contempt of Court Bill 2025. Wide-ranging changes were proposed to the law on contempt, via codification and the creation of statutory offences. Under clause 3, “contempt of court” was defined as: any of: “(a) general contempt; (b) publication contempt where proceedings are active; (c) breach contempt”.

Examples of “general contempt” (in a civil context) were:

“(a) disrupting court proceedings…

(b) obstructing court officers or staff in the execution of their duties;

(c) threatening (whether verbally or non-verbally) or assaulting such officers or staff, parties to proceedings, witnesses or jurors;

(d) taking photographs in court…

(f) disclosing (including on social media), without lawful authority, the identity of a party or witness to proceedings;

(g) making audio or video recordings of proceedings without permission…

(i) disobeying a court order made for the purpose of protecting the administration of justice (for example, embargoes on publication);

(j) disobeying a court order made for the purpose of protecting the identity of those who were participants in proceedings or publishing any information that enables them to be identified;

(k) subverting an order of the court or destroying evidence or the subject matter of the proceedings;

(l) encouraging or assisting another to disobey a court order;

(m) providing false statements or disclosures to the court;

(n) accessing court documents without authorisation;

(o) misconduct by legal representatives (for example, conduct which goes beyond mere discourtesy or a breach of professional duties)”.

“Breach contempt” was defined at clause 13 as: “deliberate failure to comply with a court order or undertaking”.

On 24th March 2026, the Legislative Council was advised (see 42 C143) that the Bill was: “proposed to be progressed in the near future”.

Note for practitioners: Current Isle of Man practice and procedure on civil contempt differs, in various significant respects, from that in England and Wales.

[Update 23.08.26] See also Khan v North of England Coachworks Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 656 as to sentence.

Disclaimer: professional advice should be sought before applying any information in a given case.

For advice on Isle of Man civil procedure or enforcement, contact Coren Law.

See also Coren Law’s Isle of Man civil procedure portal: Click On | Coren Law.

Photo: Contempt by Nick Youngson CC BY-SA 3.0 Alpha Stock Images