Recent case-law on Isle of Man Limitation Issues

Several recent Isle of Man High Court cases have considered different limitation issues in both personal injury claims and claims under the Human Rights Act 2001.

Personal injury claims

In A v DHSC (SUM 16/0062) (15.12.25), Deemster Needham considered the test for striking out a claim as an abuse of process, due to inordinate and inexcusable delay causing an inability to hold a fair trial. At § 7, he applied Megson v King Williams College (2DS 2012/24) (13.11.12), 2012 MLR N-20, approving his own summary of the principles at first instance:

“a. Is it fair or just to allow the action to go to trial?

1. In terms of what is “just”, what is the level of prejudice caused to either party in terms of either striking out the claim or allowing the matter to proceed to trial? The considerations include which party is responsible for any prejudice and whether the prejudice is so serious that it would be unjust to ‘the defendant’ to require the case to be tried.
2. Is an alternative and less Draconian sanction to that of strike out available to enable the case to be dealt with justly? The considerations should include any flexibility of the court’s case management powers to deal with this type of claim
3. In coming to its decision the court should seek to give effect to the overriding objective in rule 1.2 of the 2009 Rules….”

A delay of over 12 years since the factual events complained about was “inordinate”. But Deemster Needham held, when balancing the interests of justice, that the risk to a fair trial caused by delay was mainly the product of the Defendant’s actions. It would be wrong for it to gain a strike out “windfall”. The Defendant had accepted certain investigatory failings, which were a factor in determining the amount of prejudice affecting the ability for a fair trial. The trial process itself could cater for the difficulties which the delay caused (§§ 72-73).

The above test was also applied by the Appeal Division in Skellhorn v A&A Property Management Ltd (2DS 2025/13) (17.11.25) (at § 28). The Court upheld an appeal against a strike out, on the basis that the Appellant ought to have been given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to the question of delay, if strike out was being contemplated (§ 32).

And in Wozniak v Thompson (ORD 25/002) (21.11.25), the Court confirmed (amongst other points) that:

1. a claim is “brought” (for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1984) when received in the court office (§ 4); and
2. a late amendment to a claim to verify a statement of truth and signature would not offend against the limitation period: it did not introduce into the pleading a new or different cause of action (§ 15).

Note for practitioners: personal injury claims continue regularly to throw up limitation-related issues.

Claims under the Human Rights Act 2001

Two recent Isle of Man cases have considered the Court’s “untrammelled” discretion, under section 7(4)(b) HRA 2001, to extend the one-year time-limit to file a claim under the HRA 2001.

In A v Manx Care & another (ORD 2025/0006) (16.06.25), in which Coren Law acted for the successful Claimant, Deemster Needham permitted a claim under Article 3 ECHR to be filed out of time. A, a former care home resident, had filed a claim against Manx Care and the DHSC, based on several causes of action. The Article 3 claim was 6-9 months out of time. Granting A’s application to extend time, Deemster Needham applied the test in Adenaike v Department of Home Affairs (Prison Operations) 2018 MLR 155 on the Court’s “untrammelled” jurisdiction to extend time under section 7(4)(b) HRA 2001:

“the court must have regard to all the circumstances, all relevant factors (objective and subjective) and proportionality e.g. the length of and reason for the delay in issuing proceedings, the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence in the case is or is likely to be less cogent than it would have been, if the proceedings had been issued within the one year period, and the conduct of public authorities after the right of claim arose, including the extent (if any) to which they responded to requests reasonably made by the claimant for information for the purpose of ascertaining facts which are or might be relevant”.

Distinguishing Adenaike (where the delay was approximately 28 months), Deemster Needham held that:

1. expedition was less obviously necessary in a claim for a declaration or damages (as here) than where a quashing order is sought (§§ 35-36);
2. by not responding substantively in a timely manner to pre-action correspondence, the Defendants did not act properly (§ 44);
3. there was good reason for A to await to plead the whole claim in full, rather than piecemeal (§ 45);
4. the chronic nature of the alleged failings, and the way the Defendants were said to have acted, if proved, would raise a matter of significant public interest (§ 52); and
5. extending time was a proportionate response to the circumstances of the case (§ 53).

In Kirk v Chief Constable & another (ORD 24/0015) (04.12.25), a litigant in person, following his acquittal, filed various claims against the Chief Constable and Attorney General. These included claims under Articles 3 and 5 ECHR, filed three years after the index event. Applying Adenaike, Deemster Corlett concluded:

1. “ignorance of the limitation period is no excuse for starting claims late” (§ 31);
2. there was no medical evidence to support an extension of time (§ 32); and
3. the Claimant had not satisfied the burden of proof under section 7(4) HRA (§ 32).

(The Deemster applied similar points as to a defamation claim, applying section 30A of the Limitation Act 1984).

Note for practitioners: The wide discretion in section 7(4) HRA 2001 will yield differing outcomes.