New Practice Direction on Disclosure and Inspection

The Isle of Man now has a new Practice Direction on Disclosure and Inspection, PD 04/25. This PD sits alongside a related new Practice Direction, PD 05/25, on Electronic Disclosure, relating primarily to Ordinary Procedure cases (see separate Coren Law Update).

Practice Directions hold a special place within the Rules hierarchy. The overriding objective is even defined as including: “dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to… enforcing compliance with… practice directions” (Rule 1.2(2)(g)).

Prior to PD 04/25, the Court had held that: “the ethos governing PD 51U [in England and Wales, now largely replaced by PD 57AD] is reflected in best practice in this court”: Mir Ltd & another v Bader & related claims (ORD 21/0001, ORD 21/0002, ORD 21/0009) (29.05.25) (§ 6). (Mir also sets out advocate’s duties in relation to disclosure (§§ 21-24)).

PD 04/25 also coincides with the Court’s seminar on Managing Excessive Material in Commercial Litigation (04.11.25) (see separate Coren Law Update). There, the Court identified concerns as to: “Excessive court time and judicial resources” being “spent on peripheral matters” and the Court being ““suffocated” by excessive written material”; identified the need to: “streamline litigation to ensure efficiency, fairness and proportionality”; and warned that: “endless interlocutory skirmishes” would be discouraged. Enforcement rules would be deployed to: “prevent further decline”.

Judicial attempts to rein in complex and time-heavy specific disclosure applications are not new. In 2015, in Pentera Trustees Ltd v Old Mutual International Isle of Man Ltd (ORD 2012/38) (30.04.15) (§ 27), Deemster Corlett held: “… Applications… should only be made as a matter of last resort and there is an argument that the specific disclosure applications were not sufficiently preceded by a reasoned explanation of where the Defendants had allegedly gone wrong with their standard disclosure”. But guidance in Pentera (so the Court stated in November 2025) was “largely ignored”. 

So codifying the Court’s expectations on disclosure and inspection may be viewed as part of a trend – the Court’s tougher new approach towards litigation conduct contributing to overloading the Court.

What does PD04/25 set out?

PD 04/25 is, first, a useful refresher on key provisions within the Rules on disclosure and inspection.

The PD starts with a “General” section. This references the disclosing party’s duty to make a reasonable search for documents falling within the paragraphs of Rule 7.35 and the duty (unless Rule 7.39(7) applies) to make a list of the documents of whose existence the party is aware that fall within those paragraphs and which are or have been within the party’s control (Rule 7.37).There is a reminder that standard disclosure obligations can be dispensed with or limited by the Court or written agreement (Rule 7.34(3)).

There are further sections dealing with:

• “The search”
• “Electronic disclosure”
• “The list”
• “Disclosure statement”
• “Specific disclosure”
• “Claims to withhold disclosure or inspection of a document”
• “Inspection of documents mentioned in expert’s report (Rule 7.43(2))” and
• “False disclosure statement”.

Note for practitioners: To pick out 5 points:

• Definition of “document” Rule 7.31 defines “document” as “anything in which information of any description is recorded”. PD 04/25 elaborates on this definition (at para 6): “Rule 7.31 contains a broad definition of a document. This extends to electronic documents, including e-mail and other electronic communications, word processed documents and databases. In addition to documents that are readily accessible from computer systems and other electronic devices and media, the definition covers those documents that are stored on servers and back-up systems and electronic systems that have been ‘deleted’. It also extends to additional information stored and associated with electronic documents known as metadata”. This expanded definition may be read alongside the Court’s guidance, on advocates’ duties in relation to disclosure, in Mir (above), and DHSC v Ranson (ORD 22/16) (11.10.22) (§§ 24-27);
• Supplemental disclosure Rule 7.40(2) requires a party to “notify” every other party as to documents which come to a party’s notice at any time during proceedings. PD 04/25 clarifies that if, after a list of documents has been served, the existence of a (disclosable) document comes to a party’s attention, that party must serve a supplemental list (para 10);
• Advocate’s duty to ensure maker of disclosure statement understands duty Rule 7.39(5) already requires the maker of a disclosure statement to certify that he understand the duty to disclose documents. Para 14 imposes a further duty on any advocate to endeavour to ensure that a person for whom he is acting understands the duty of disclosure;
• Nature of specific disclosure order Para 22 provides that a specific disclosure order may in an appropriate case direct a party to: “a) carry out a search for any documents which it is reasonable to suppose may contain information which may- i. enable the party applying for disclosure either to advance his own case or to damage that of the party giving disclosure; or ii. lead to a train of enquiry which has either of those consequences; and b) disclose any documents found as a result of that search”; and
• False disclosure statement Para 27 draws attention to Rule 7.52, which sets out the consequences of making a false disclosure statement without an honest belief in its truth.